

JPRS-SSA-84-074

26 June 1984

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

26 June 1984

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS

ANGOLA

Advisory Council Studies First Quarter Plans (F. Diogo; JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 18 May 84)	1
Luanda Assembly Session Discusses Capital's Problems (Lolo Agostinho; JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 18 May 84)	3
Ship Building Contract With Spain Encounters Problems (JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 17 May 84)	5
Great Potential Seen for Agriculture in Kilengues (L. Luansi; JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 19 May 84)	8
Savimbi's Dependence on South Africa Discussed (Anthony Delius; THE CAPE TIMES, 28 May 84)	10
Briefs	
First Quarter Fish Figures	12
'Fina' Petroleum Figures	12
TGFA Seminar Ends	12
Meat Shortage	13
National Coffee Institute Formed	13
Government Officials Visit Bengo Province	13
USSR Fishing Complex	13
FNLA Communique	14

CAPE VERDE

Briefs	
Icelandic Tuna Vessel	15

KENYA

Britain Waives Debt Owed by EAC (THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 25 May 84)	16
---	----

Briefs		
	Ties With FRG	17
MOZAMBIQUE		
Briefs		
	Soviet Aircraft Purchased	18
	Maputo Warns Swazis	18
NAMIBIA		
	SA Said in Namibia for Political, Not Military Reasons (Helmoed-Romer Heitman; FRONTLINE, No 7, Apr 84)	19
	Negotiations With SWAPO Said to SA's Advantage (Gwen Lister; WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 5 May 84)	23
	Results of Lusaka Meeting Analyzed (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, No 11, 23 May 84)	27
	Mudge Scored for 'Forgetting' Turnhalle Concept (Editorial; WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 28 Apr 84)	32
	MPC Urged To Inform Public on Discussions (Editorial; THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 25 May 84)	33
	Columnist Examines Banning of Court Case (Gwen Lister; WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 5 May 84)	34
	White SWAPO Member Receives Death Threats (Peter Kenny; THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 18 May 84)	36
	White Member of SWAPO Replies to Accusations (Anton Lubowski; THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 5 Jun 84)	38
	Garoeb: MPC Now a SA Tool (THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 28 May 84)	40
	WINDHOEK OBSERVER To Fight Publications Board Banning (THE WINDHOEK ADVEPTISER, 28 May 84)	41
Briefs		
	AWB Affiliation Banned	42
	Nujoma 25 May Statement	42
	Copper Mining Equipment	42
NIGERIA		
	Analysis Reports No Progress in Agriculture in Last 10 Years (AFRICA NOW, No 38, Jun 84)	43

Analysis of Military Tribunal, Law Court Controversy Provided (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, No 11, 23 May 84)	45
'Ghost' Bakers Blamed for Kano Bread Scarcity (Murtala Abdullahi, Salisu Alhassan; SUNDAY TRIUMPH, 13 May 84)	47
Sugar Company Reportedly on Verge of Collapse (Bako Mohammed; SUNDAY TRIUMPH, 13 May 84)	48
High Price of Meat Blamed for Shortfall in Animal Population (Mariam Aleshinloye; NEW NIGERIAN, 28 Apr 84)	50
Clampdown on Bunkerers Leads To Fuel Buildup (NEW NIGERIAN, 12 May 84)	51
Briefs Dam Project Threatened	52
SOUTH AFRICA	
Utility of Sanctions by International Community Discussed (INFORMATIONSDIENST SUDLICHES AFRIKA, Mar 84)	53
Sanctions as International Pressure, by Heinz Moellers Relevance of Sanctions Examined, by Rainer Falk	
SACP Secretary General Interviewed (Moses Mabhida Interview; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Apr 84)	59
Walvis Bay Faces 'Devastating Negative Growth' (NAMIB TIMES, 25 May 84)	64
ZIMBABWE	
Mines Minister Says Government Will Continue To Sustain Mines (THE HERALD, 23 May 84)	66
Drought Relief Not Enough for Chibi North Area (THE SUNDAY MAIL, 27 May 84)	68
Renco Gold Mine Prospers (Charles Chikerema; THE HERALD, 30 May 84)	69
Men Help Wounded Bandit Flee (THE HERALD, 23 May 84)	71
Briefs Health Hazards at Camps	73
Imported Maize Needed	73
Floods Hit Truck Convoys	73

Bulawayo Priest Detained	74
Cattle Invade Maize Plots	74
Big Railway Export Order	74
Loan To Boost Exports	74
Increased Cotton Production	75
NRZ To Extend Electrification	75

ADVISORY COUNCIL STUDIES FIRST QUARTER PLANS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 18 May 84 p 3

[Article by F. Diogo]

[Text] The Ministry of Industry advisory council has been meeting since yesterday in the city of Lubango, assessing the execution of the plans for the first quarter of 1984 and the proposed revision of the National Emergency Plan for this year. The study of the emergency programs, which is being conducted in six committees and two general sessions, will also be taken up by the Ministry of Industry Advisory Council.

In the opening session, Industry Minister Bento Ribeiro gave a detailed explanation of the functioning of the sector which he directs. He began by noting that "the technical-economic plan for 1984 has already pointed out the 134 products included in the plan, which ones will be involved in the implementation of each of the emergency programs and what raw materials will be needed for their production." The minister then described those programs.

In his address, Bento Ribeiro also noted that "special attention was given to the program to provision the armed forces. In assessing the provisioning of the defense and security forces, we can say that the quotas for the textile industry products (including clothing), plastics, alcohol, paints, metal products and aluminum materials, tires and inner tubes have been met 100 percent. Where quotas were not met, in some cases it was owing to objective problems. For example, only 42 percent of the beer was supplied because of problems with the return of bottles; this is a general problem in the beverage industry, and is aggravated by the transportation problems, particularly in the interior of the country," he explained.

Regarding better utilization of the installed capacity, the minister said there had been a realistic reevaluation of the productive capacity available to meet the production plans for this year, based not only on the nominally installed capacity but also on the state of maintenance of the equipment and the technical ability to operate it.

Bento Ribeiro added: "Another general guideline, which is to be established by the ministry, consists in integrating the projects for reconversion of the

country's industrial park in the sectoral studies--the so-called management plans. After a diagnosis of the existing situation and the market prospects, these will point to technical solutions.

"The activity of the national directorates has undergone an important development in that the management capacity of the companies has been established and strengthened and their development guidelines are being defined through the sectoral studies and the management plans," the industry minister said.

One of the concerns noted by the minister was the normal operation and management of the companies, since they are the ones that insure production. The minister noted the interruption in the supply of raw and subsidiary materials, caused, among other things, by the shortage of funds; the power and water shortage and import problems affecting Huambo and Benguela provinces, mainly; and the inadequate investment in replacement parts and technical assistance for the equipment.

"The balance sheet for the execution of the 1983 plan indicates that industrial production declined for the second consecutive year. In effect, the manufacturing industry achieved only 85 percent of the production for the previous year, and only 75 percent of the plan. Production was 87 percent [of the 1982 figure] for the food industry, and 82 percent for light industry and 97 percent for heavy industry, or 71.84 and 59 percent, respectively, of the plan. These levels of non-execution and of economic resources should be cause for concern for all of us, so the revised production goals can represent an improvement in the level of industrial production," the minister concluded. [Quotation as published]

Participating in the council are Adriano dos Santos, minister of domestic trade, and Justino Fernandes, vice minister of industry, as well as national directors, provincial delegates, company directors and office of planning chiefs, among others. The proceedings are scheduled to end today at 1800 hours.

6362

CS0: 3442/381

LUANDA ASSEMBLY SESSION DISCUSSES CAPITAL'S PROBLEMS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 18 May 84 p 3

[Article by Lolo Agostinho: "Attention Focused on Health Situation in Capital"]

[Text] The 12th regular session of the Luanda Province People's Assembly, which began last Tuesday, ended its proceedings on Thursday. The session was chaired by Assembly President Mariano da Costa Garcia (Puku), member of the MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee.

The session examined the minutes of the 11th regular session and the 3d extraordinary session of the Provincial People's Assembly, as well as the reports of the Provincial Commission for 1983 and the first quarter of 1984.

The proceedings also focused on the presentation and analysis of the reports of three permanent working committees, specifically: Planning, Finance, Labor and Social Security; Health, Education, Culture, Sports and Social Affairs; and, finally, Justice, Defense, Security, Public Order and Citizens Complaints and Suggestions. It is regrettable that the following committees failed to present reports: Community Services, Public Provisioning, Housing, Construction and Services; Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fishing; and Industry, Transportation and Services. The committees claimed they lacked a quorum at the time they were scheduled to meet.

As the highest governing body in the province, the Luanda Provincial People's Assembly approved a resolution for the dismissal of some deputies for the mismanagement of their functions and their replacement with others, and new coordinators were appointed to the six standing working committees; comrades Mariano Bernardino Machado, Antonio de Jesus Pereira Bravo, Joao Manuel Tombia, Pedro da Silva Feijo Sobrinho, Jose Alberto Kipungo and Paulo Pedro Domingos were appointed to the following committees: Planning, Finance, Labor and Social Security; Community Services, Public Supply, Housing, Construction and Services; Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing; Health and Social Welfare, Education, Culture and Sports; Industry, Transportation and Services; and Justice, Defense, Security, Public order and Citizens Complaints and Suggestions, respectively.

The following deputies were elected to the Luanda People's Assembly: Joao Manuel Tombia, Jose Almeida Kipungo, Pedro da Silva Feijo Sobrinho, Abilio da Costa, Manuel da Fonseca Pinheiro, Joao Tuta, Joao Baptista Coutinho Octavio, Antonio Paulo Dias, Joao Pedro N'Gunji, Luis Manuel Jose (Pouca Sorte), Armindo Francisco

and Feliciano Antonio dos Santos, replacing outgoing deputies Francisco Antonio Braganca, Mariano Jose Cristiano Neto, Alberto de Almeida, Francisco Tiago da Silva, Candido Bartolomeu Joaquim, Rosalino Inacio Neto, Adolfo Paulo Gamboa, Adelino Gaspar Correia, Miguel Adao Sebastiao, Eduardo Manuel Adao Antonio and Augusto Eduardo--the last two already deceased.

In the closing session, it was recommended that the Luanda Provincial Commission organize and structure a support center for the Luanda Greenbelt, that a detailed report be presented at the next session on the current status of the funerary problem and on concrete measures for its solution, and that greater human and material support be provided to meet the commission's obligations, particularly in the area of public sanitation.

It was recommended that the Provincial Delegation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, ENAS [National Water and Sanitation Company] and EDEL [Electric Power Company] give greater attention to telecommunications (telephone installations), the drinking water supply and electric power services, and that the Provincial Directorate of Community Services assist more in the removal of trash and dead animals from public roads.

In the closing session, Comrade Mariano Puku, president of the Provincial People's Assembly, urged all the deputies to assume their directive and executive responsibilities to assess and carry out the ambitious plans and projects for the conservation and maintenance of the city of Luanda, which is still experiencing major problems with hygiene and sanitation.

"We are criticized about the trash collections, but no one criticizes the people who make the city dirty," Mariano Puku said at one point, alluding to the attitude of some residents who leave trash in the streets even when there are containers available to them. The official noted the appointment of commission inspectors, who will be on the streets to monitor the state of hygiene and sanitation in the city's streets and even in its housing.

He added that the measure will require that the entire population directly support the commission inspectors, because this important step will prevent business establishments from throwing their trash in the street and parking large trucks on the sidewalks in the future, as well as the sad situation surrounding the disposition of bodily remains, to the point that identity cards must be left at the cemetery for want of death certificates.

6362

CS0: 3442/381

ANGOLA

SHIP BUILDING CONTRACT WITH SPAIN ENCOUNTERS PROBLEMS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 May 84 p 12

[Article by .M.: "Angola's Fishing Boats Remain in Spanish Shipyards"]

[Text] Madrid--Some 26 fishing boats ordered by the People's Republic of Angola [RPA] from the Kingdom of Spain are still waiting at the Spanish shipyards because the Angolan Ministry of Fishing cannot meet its responsibilities, it has been learned from a reliable source in Madrid. The 26 ships, completed recently for the RPA, were purchased under a contract signed with Spain on 23 March 1981, providing for construction of 37 fishing vessels, at a cost of \$53 million.

In November 1983, the Spanish shipyards turned over the first 11 ships, and 15 more ships were turned over this month. However, the ships, which should already be fishing in Angola, are still moored at the shipyards of that Iberian country, awaiting equipment and fishnets, which the Ministry of Fishing has not provided.

This lack, and the lack of crews, made it impossible for the ships to be put through the traditional sea trials at the time of delivery. This is very important, because it is through these trials that it is ascertained if the ships meet the specifications of the contract.

Another contractual issue is the involvement of the Portuguese firm NAVIPA (Naval Equipment Industry Ltd), which supplies hydraulic equipment, cranes, capstans, steering gear, electrical outlets and various other parts to ENATIP-UEE [National Enterprise for the Provision of Technical Materiel to the Fishing Industry]. Some of the equipment installed on the ships acquired from Spain came from the same Portuguese company which acted as the intermediary with the Ministry of Fishing.

NAVIPA, which came into the deal and also shared in its profits, was created in 1976 from the former "FLUID/MEC," which operated in Angola prior to national independence. Made up in part by businessmen who fled Angola following the liberation, NAVIPA obtains much of the material needed by the Ministry of Fishing from suppliers with legal ties to the company.

In 1983 alone, imports effected through NAVIPA amounted to 18 million kwanzas. According to experts in the international market for fishing equipment, by

operating this way, the RPA pays too much for the equipment it buys; it would be more advantageous to buy directly from the manufacturers, without the intervention of a third party, which certainly takes its cut.

Moreover, there is a company in Angola--IDROMEC--which, if it were functioning, could meet many of the naval equipment needs of the Fishing Ministry. The lack of dynamism and organization is impeding the activation of that important economic unit.

Addenda to the contract lead one to believe that the Angolan party did not prepare its positions adequately with regard to the contract. It is noted that, after the contract was signed in 1981, in 1982 the Ministry of Fishing proposed changes, which were accepted by the National Bank of Angola, according to a letter forwarded to ENATIP-UEE on 3 December 1982, which states: "Regarding the matter in the passage quoted (changes in the contract for the Spanish ships), this letter confirms our agreement."

Several other problems arose during the construction of the ships. Under the terms of the contract, the Spanish shipyards submitted the ships' designs to the Ministry of Fishing for approval before they began construction. When they received no reply, the builders began construction without prior consultation with the Angolan party. The Fishing Ministry had appointed a Polish technical team, led by Engineer Jean Bialek, to superintend construction. To the extent that it could, the Polish team demanded some construction changes. With no word from Angola, some of the ships were built with very small compartments. According to experts in the sector, this would make it difficult for the crews to maneuver during fishing operations.

With the intervention of the Polish team, it was possible to make some changes, but they were not entirely adequate. The contract, which cost the RPA tens of millions of dollars, was not supervised responsibly enough.

According to a source linked to ship construction in Spain, the last 11 ships are scheduled for delivery to the RPA this May. For want of a clear decision by the Angolan authorities on the acquisition of equipment and nets, it would seem that the 37-boat fishing fleet, purchased by the Angolan government to solve the problems of the fish shortage on the national market, will be remaining in Spain for some time to come.

According to the documentation pertaining to the ships, in 1983 a delegation from ENATIP-UEE visited Spain and met with the "LEO/MARCO" and DUPSA supply companies. ENATIP's recommendations to the directorate of the Ministry of Fishing never received a reply, so this problem is still unresolved, to the detriment of the Angolan economy.

The contract with Spain has already been extended more than twice because of the constant revisions made by the Ministry of Fishing, which explains the delay in the scheduled delivery of the ships, independent of other factors involved in their construction.

The Spanish builders, in response to the revisions, demanded a 1.4 percent commission from the purchaser, the RPA, because of the extension of the delivery

date. According to some receipts in the foreign exchange department of the National Bank of Angola, in 1983 alone, the Angolan Government was obliged to pay fees in excess of 3 million kwanzas.

NAVIPA, which to a certain extent exerted its "influence" in the contracts signed by the Ministry of Fishing, often functioned as a liaison with the Spanish shipyards.

In evidence, we note a telex sent by NAVIPA on 26 November 1982 to Vasco Martins, national director of fishing, according to which "the Ferrol shipyards are awaiting instructions on the matter of the decks and holds." "Rui Pereira is going to Spain on a technical visit regarding the installation of equipment; if anything is needed, he will report today by telex," the text notes.

The use of third parties in the dealings with the Spanish shipyards considerably impeded Angola's supervision of the contract; foreigners were negotiating serious issues for the RPA, which created great confusion for the builders because there was no continuing authority with whom they could exchange information.

After the contract was signed in 1981, the sector responsible for fishing activities should have scheduled an intensive course for the Angolans who would form the crews for the ships under construction. The shortage of hands is leading the Ministry of Fishing to consider the possibility of hiring foreign personnel, which will cost the RPA huge sums in foreign exchange.

The ships moored at the "Santo Domingo" shipyard are entirely seaworthy and carry very modern equipment. However, they require minimally qualified personnel to operate 100 percent.

Until the dilemma is solved, ships which could be of great use to our national reconstruction remain in the Spanish shipyards, in danger of deterioration; as a Spanish technician told us: "They were built to be used and not to be idle."

6362

CSO: 3442/381

GREAT POTENTIAL SEEN FOR AGRICULTURE IN KILENGUES

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 19 May 84 p 12

[Article by L. Luansi]

[Text] Agriculture in the municipality of Kilingues is characterized by the production of grains, including corn, massango and massambala, fruit gardening and livestock activities, one of the oldest traditions in the area.

With an estimated population of 80,000 inhabitants, the municipality of Kilingues is located to the north of Huila and is adjacent to the province of Benguela, 130 kilometers from the city of Lubango. The farm situation of this municipality, despite the levels achieved, is still not of the best, due mainly to the shortage of labor and fertilizers.

The problem of establishing 'chimpacas' for the watering of cattle and the regular supply of accessories and spare parts for the tractors of the 1 May Production Unit Group (AUP) are among the recommendations made by the Provincial People's Assembly, the fulfillment of which has long been awaited.

During the final quarter of last year, production reached about a ton per hectare for 1,150 hectares of various products.

1 May AUP

As the largest socioeconomic center in the municipality, the 1 May AUP has 613 full-time workers, as well as others employed on a part-time basis in the selection of tobacco, one of the main crops, on which the yield is very low.

The production plan for this year calls for 500 hectares of corn, 40 of potatoes, 40 of various garden crops, along with rice, and others for tobacco. This somewhat ambitious plan may be threatened by the shortage of material resources needed and, according to the estimates of the local officials, fulfillment is estimated at 50 or 60 percent.

The production of corn and other grains such as rice, massango and massambala looks promising because of the relatively regular rainfall on the region. For example, estimates call for 40 tons of rice for the coming harvest and more than 300 tons of corn.

The production of fruit crops has reached a satisfactory level, but the prices put in effect by the ENCODIPA [National Company for Purchase and

Distribution of Agricultural Products] have led to a certain abandonment by the peasants. This domestic trade body purchases oranges at 7 kwanzas per kilogram for later sale at 2 or 3 times that price.

Tobacco Production and Farm Cooperativization

The production of tobacco at the Kilengues AUPs has been characterized by regrettable situations, although this is a crop of economic importance.

Many factors have contributed to the drop in production for this product, which is the main raw material for the cigarette factories. Outstanding among these factors are the necessary high production costs, the shortage of suitable fertilizers and, finally, the empirical method used in drying the leaves.

The production cost comes to 200 kwanzas per kilogram of tobacco, while it is sold to the Angolan Tobacco Export Company (SETA) in Benguela for 80, which has led to the accumulation of sizeable losses, running to about 12 million kwanzas for each 100 hectares.

Currently, the preparation of the seed beds for tobacco plants is the focus of the concern of the farm workers at the 1 May AUP. Also planned is experimentation with seeds obtained from Zimbabwe, which the director of the group says are of admirable quality and high profitability.

In the farm cooperativization sector, much effort has been made with a view to increasing production, despite the difficulties which the 1,376 members have encountered.

Another sector which should be stressed is animal health, in which connection a series of vaccination campaigns have been pursued against the two main diseases which have decimated the livestock of our population.

Thus more than 20,000 head of livestock have already been vaccinated against carbuncle and peripneumonia, and plans call for the vaccination by the end of August of about 150,000 head of cattle, including 1,000 belonging to the state.

In conclusion, we can say that agriculture can be greatly extended in the municipality of Kilengues. It is necessary to overcome the shortage of spare parts facing the peasants in order to minimize the import of raw materials for our cigarette factories.

5157

CSO: 3442/384

SAVIMBI'S DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA DISCUSSED

Cape Town THE CAPE TIMES in English 28 May 84 p 10

[Article by Anthony Delius]

[Text]

LONDON — Next week, as the South African Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, begins his visit to Europe and the last of South Africa's soldiers and guerillas cross the border out of Angola, the hardy men of Unita will be left contemplating their lonely role in what might be a very different struggle for Southern Africa.

What they would dearly like to be confident about in the oncoming months of diplomatic confusion and military uncertainty is how much further they can rely upon the South Africans.

Have they now become even more useful trading assets in the bigger game the Republic is playing for position in Southern Africa, or have they a more permanent value?

They must know how much the rest of Africa has fallen for the insistent anti-Unita propaganda that has been spread across the continent and wider afield both by the "progressive" African states and the far left among the Portuguese.

Publicists

A mindless hate against them has been built up among the political majority of the black states.

They might, in fact, be the bravest and toughest nationalists on this continent, but in the minds of the publicists for African nationalism they are its major traitors.

In the mechanical reasoning process adopted by black journalists, academics and politicians, leaders of Unita have sold the pass by accepting South African support in the Angolan civil war in the long nine years since that began.

White South Africa is the great enemy in Africa's midst and any group of Africans associated with white South Africa is a group of traitors.

Trade-off

The refusal by Dr Jonas Savimbi, Unita's leader, to have any truck with communism or the popular version of African socialism has made them doubly reprehensible in other African eyes, especially those that read the propaganda on international affairs by the far left.

Dr Savimbi must know full well that any political trade-off proposed to South Africa for some temporary accommodation at the expense of Unita's position is one that offers many temptations to influential men in Africa.

Memories are not so short that it is no longer remembered how quickly even the sensible Dr Kenneth Kaunda was persuaded to change his description of Unita's enemies as "cubs of the Soviet bear" to something more flattering.

Dr Savimbi must have noted how the South Africans were willing to join the Angolan talks in Lusaka without the presence of Unita.

Faithfulness to former friends, many observers in Africa are now telling one another, is not a great distinguishing mark of politician undertaking what they believe will be negotiations likely to favour their own long-distance aims.

No doubt Unita has been assured by their South African contacts that their interests will not be forgotten in whatever deals the Republic's spokesmen are able to wring from Africans in the new diplomatic moves.

The Unita men, however, must be looking nervously over their shoulders at this particular juncture.

What adjustments of loyalty might come out of the Nkomati Accord? the Angola guerillas must ask themselves.

They must find themselves as suspicious of both friends and enemies, at the moment, as much of Africa's political leadership is of Dr Savimbi himself.

Roberto

Speaking for myself, as an intermittent African political observer, I have been an admirer of Dr Savimbi for 20 years now.

I first encountered him on board a Nile steamer, where as a fresh-faced young black guerilla (he looks like a

genial bearded pirate now) he had come to announce his breakaway from the highly unscrupulous leadership of Mr Holden Roberto, leader of the UPA, later to be called the GRAE, the Angolan government in exile.

As the young "foreign minister" of the latter organization, Dr Savimbi had chosen his moment in the middle of an OAU summit to break away in protest against the highly questionable activities of his leader. He founded the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

He had then gone into the field against the Portuguese in Angola with a group of a dozen supporters. He claimed that they were armed with a dozen knives and some assorted explosives.

Soon he found himself fighting his fellow guerillas in the MPLA and the UPA for the right to go his own way.

About the time the Portuguese began their hasty pull-out from Angola his movement grew enormously, rivaling the MPLA under Dr Agostinho Neto, a Marxist poet.

Dr Savimbi regarded Dr Neto and his supporters as heavily dependent on the Soviets and unlikely to bring about the "total" independence of Angola.

After narrowly escaping with his life from attempts to negotiate an alliance with the MPLA, Dr Savimbi co-operated with the South Africans in an invasion of Angola against its MPLA rulers.

Then a heavy delivery of Soviet arms and the landing of Cuban troops in considerable numbers forced the South Africans to withdraw.

Relying upon his close connections with Angola's biggest tribal group, the Ovimbundu, Dr Savimbi remained behind to continue the fight in what was still a civil war. In spite of continuing heavy Soviet support and the growing presence of Cuban troops, Unita has expanded loose control over much of Angola.

He has been helped in this by South African supplies and finance plus further help from Morocco, Zaire, Saudi Arabia, and a bit from America.

Dr Savimbi reckons he is fairly well dug in and is intent upon winning Unita a partnership in running Angola — at the moment the MPLA government has no single member of the Ovimbundu group in its dozen members of the Politburo.

Though a strong nationalist and much against apartheid, Dr Savimbi would be hard-pressed if South Africa ceased to help him.

BRIEFS

FIRST QUARTER FISH FIGURES--Kwanza Norte--From January to April 1983, the provincial directorate of EDIPESCA [State Fish Distribution Enterprise] sold 315 tons of fish, valued at 10,408,000 kwanzas, the Angolan news agency ANGOP learned from EDIPESCA director Paulo Manuel. According to the director, the distribution plan for the year is 2,000 tons of fish, a figure which is far from being achieved, since distribution is well below the monthly quota of 196 tons, as a result of the country's poor fish catch. The short supply of fish has been accentuated recently, with the shortage of dried fish. The amounts supplied do not meet the needs of this province, which has a population estimated at 500,000 inhabitants. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 18 May 84 p 3] 6362

'FINA' PETROLEUM FIGURES--Of the 1,817,040 metric tons of crude oil produced in 1983 (1.8 percent less than in 1982) in the Kwanza and Congo basins, 644,792 metric tons (1.2 percent less than last year) were produced by FINA Petroleum of Angola. Of FINA's 644,792 metric tons, 477,837 tons were sold to the refinery and the rest was exported to PETROFINA. FINA Petroleum of Angola operates in the Kwanza and Congo basins in association with SONANGOL [National Angolan Fuel Company], and there is another association which, in addition to these two companies, also includes TFXACO, in the Congo basin. The company's balance sheet indicates that in 1983 FINA Petroleum of Angola invested 538,448,561.00 kwanzas, or about 28 percent more than the sum invested in 1982. Of that amount, 427,307,398.00 kwanzas were invested in prospecting and the rest in the refinery sector. Profits for the year came to 582,663,489.00 kwanzas, 501,051,470.00 kwanzas of this from prospecting activities and production and the rest from refining. FINA's accounts also show that the 1983 profit was 8.3 percent less than in 1982, because of the drop in sales of crude oil, which reduced the profit from production and prospecting activity. This reduction is partially offset by the increase in refining activity, thanks to the increase in the "mise-en-oeuvre," which came to 4.6 percent. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 May 84 p 3] 6362

TGFA SEMINAR ENDS--The first seminar for combat training specialists of the TGFA [Angola Border Guard Troops], which began on 8 May, ended yesterday in Benguela Province. After intensive study and discussion of the selected topics, the participants concluded that greater attention should be given to the education and instruction of highly skilled cadres and to broadening the understanding of the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy to the field of education.

At the closing session, Capt Lito de Almeida, chief of staff of the TGFA, said it was important to apply the decisions they had reached in daily practice. Noting the importance of combat training for the troops, the chief of staff stressed the need to apply in future the technical-scientific knowledge acquired in the seminar, to benefit the troops with the new methods of combat training. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 May 84 p 3] 6362

MEAT SHORTAGE--Lubango--DINAPROPE [National Cattle Products Distributing Company] distributed about 400 tons of meat in the first quarter of 1984, but twice that amount would be necessary to insure a regular supply. Pascoal Faria, provincial director of DINAPROPE, told the Angolan news agency ANGOP that the reason for the meat shortage is the scarcity of goods to barter for the cattle in the possession of the peasants, estimated in the thousands of heads. The marketing figures for meat were low last year, although the figures were not representative of the livestock potential of the province. [Excerpts] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 May 84 p 3] 6362

NATIONAL COFFEE INSTITUTE FORMED--By dispatch, the Defense and Security Council has created the INCA (National Coffee Institute), attached to the Ministry of Agriculture but with administrative and financial autonomy and its own legal personality and capacity. The decree published in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA also approved the organic statutes of the agency. According to the document, the purpose of the INCA is to promote the adoption of international coffee policy in accordance with the country's interests. INCA will be responsible for the orientation and supervision of activity pertaining to the production, marketing and export of coffee. The Defense and Security Council decree advises the Agriculture Ministry to approve the organizational chart of the institute within 90 days. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 May 84 p 1] 6362

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS VISIT BONGO PROVINCE--Augusto Joao, vice minister of agriculture for coffee, went last week to Bongo Province, where he visited the Dembo I, II, III and IV coffee growing companies in Quibaxe-Dembos Municipio. After a lengthy tour of those production units, the government official met with all their directors, with whom he assessed the prospects for the next coffee harvest, as well as the efforts to mobilize the necessary means for the approaching harvest campaign. On that occasion, Augusto Joao called for a spirit of cooperation and neighborliness among the coffee companies to solve the many problems they face. Ramos da Cruz, the Agriculture Ministry delegate for Bongo province, accompanied the minister. On Wednesday, at the Ceramics Company of Angola (CCA) in Caxito, Carlos Neto, vice minister of construction for building materials, examined questions pertaining to the resumption of production of bathroom fixtures, tiles and household wares. At the CCA, which is the only production unit of its type in the country and which has been idle for some time, Carlos Neto met with the directors, with whom he brought up the increasing demand for china ware and construction tiles. [Excerpts] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 19 May 84 p 3] 6362

USSR FISHING COMPLEX--An agreement to set up a large fisheries complex in Angola has been drawn up between the Soviet Union and Angola, states the authoritative publication Fishing News International published in London. The report says the complex will include wharves, shiprepair facilities, shops to make gear, a fish processing factory to produce smoked and dried fish, a cold store, a trading centre, offices and other premises. Under a

separate economic and technical co-operation agreement the Soviet Union will deliver fishing vessels, material and equipment to Angola. The Angolan planning minister Lopo do Nascimento has said that the complex will provide jobs for some 6 000 people, the publication reports. [Text] [Walvis Bay NAMIB TIMES in English 25 May 84 p 3]

FNLA COMMUNIQUE--The general staff of the ELNA (the armed branch of the FNLA) has sent us the following communique, which we quote in full: "On 10 April of this year, the government of Luanda concentrated troop strength assessed at 2,000 men, one brigade, in the city of Uige (formerly Carmona), in the province of the same name, with a view to recovering the localities in Dembos captured by our forces last 16 March. On 11 April, this brigade left Uige and moved toward Dembos in three columns, which encountered various ambushes before reaching the localities we had occupied--Bela Vista, Zala, Gombe and Quixixe in the province of Luanda, and Quipedro in the province of Uige--and experienced great difficulty in advancing because of the trees cut down and the small wooden bridges destroyed along the access roads to those localities. On 12 April, the Dembos region was practically surrounded by the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola], which launched some attacks against our positions with aerial bombing and heavy artillery, but without succeeding in reoccupying the positions we defended. As a result of the battles waged to date, the FAPLA have suffered confirmed casualties including 13 dead and 35 wounded. The FNLA forces seized about 2,000 bullets, 17 AKA rifles and one 16mm mortar, as well as other less important equipment. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 15 May 84 p 20] 5157

CSO: 3442/384

BRIEFS

ICELANDIC TUNA VESSEL--The much discussed and long awaited Fengur docked Sunday morning, 6 May, at Porto Grande de Sao Vicente. It is the fishing vessel which the government of Iceland offered to Cape Verde during the visit paid to that country last year by our president. This vessel, 27.3 meters in length and 7.4 meters in breadth, has a gross weight of 140 tons and a storage capacity for 50 to 60 tons of tuna. It is operated by a crew of 20. The Fengur, which means "hunter" in the Icelandic language, was built in Iceland expressly to operate in Cape Verdian seas. We wish our new fishing vessel a promising future within the context of the growth we so much need and desire. [Text] [Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 12 May 84 p 3] 5157

CSO: 3442/384

BRITAIN WAIVES DEBT OWED BY EAC

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 25 May 84 p 33

[Text]

FOLLOWING the signing of the final accord for the disbursement of the assets and liabilities of the defunct East African Community by the heads of state of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in Arusha last week, the British government has announced the waiving of £4.8 million (about shs. 94.6 million) debts owed to Britain by the defunct Community. The British prime minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, sent a message to Presidents Moi of Kenya, Obote of Uganda and Nyerere of Tanzania on Thursday last week to announce the waiver; the debts had resulted from loans from several British sources, including the official British aid programme to Community institutions when they existed. Other debts emanated from export credits.

The three East African heads of state signed the final accord for the division of the assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC on Monday last week and at the same time set the ball rolling to open up new avenues for future East African cooperation. The assets and liabilities that are to be disbursed totalled over shs. 12 billion, with Kenya taking 42 per cent, Tanzania 32 per cent and Uganda 26 per cent. The agreement was reached after nearly six years of arduous negotiations by the Swiss World Bank-appointed mediator, Dr. Victor Umbricht, who undertook the identification and assessment of the assets and liabilities after his appointment in January, 1978. He hired

42 experts in various field who worked in various posts where the Community operated as well as organising numerous meetings with former Community executives and ministers of the three East African governments to reach the final agreement on the division. The cost of the exercise was financed by the World Bank together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The major assets and liabilities to be disbursed belonged to the former East African Railways and Harbours Corporation, the East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, East African Airways and the general fund services which included the department of statistics, customs, medical, various EAC research institutions, air traffic control and the meteorology department. The experts who undertook to assess the defunct EAC assets and liabilities included accountants, bankers, engineers, pilots, experts on ports, navigation and railways.

The major creditors to the defunct EAC included the World Bank, Britain, Canada, West Germany and Italy. Following the signing of the final accord for the division of the assets and liabilities, the three East African heads of state recommended the creation of an arbitration tribunal to solve any disputes that might arise during the implementation of the agreement. Also to be formed is an institution that will coordinate all efforts towards future East African cooperation. ■

BRIEFS

TIES WITH FRG--Kenya and the Federal Republic of Germany have a proud record of co-operation in the field of commerce and industry and there are good prospects for expansion. At present, more than one hundred German firms are represented in Kenya and many renowned German enterprises have carried out investments in Kenya. The German Development Company (DEG), which finances German private investments in developing countries, is a major investor in Kenya. It also cooperates with the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK) to finance small- and medium-sized projects in the private sector. Up to the end of last year, German private investment in Kenya topped the shs.500 million mark. This investment has been in the hotel, pharmaceutical, textile and packaging industries, and in horticulture and servicing equipment. The Federal Republic is a major trading partner of Kenya's. Kenya exports 46 percent of its total coffee output to Germany, tea, sisal, fruits and vegetables, flowers, and hides and skins in return for machinery, chemical and pharmaceutical products, textiles and food items. The government and the people of the Federal Republic of Germany are determined to enhance further the excellent cooperation and partnership which has developed between the two countries since Kenya's independence 20 years ago. [Text] [Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 25 May 84 p 26]

CSO: 3400/1075

BRIEFS

SOVIET AIRCRAFT PURCHASED--A new airplane with the capacity to transport about 170 passengers arrived in the capital of the country yesterday. It was purchased from the government of the Soviet Union for use exclusively on international flights, thus expanding the prospects for establishing new routes to the Asian and African continents. The first announcement of these facts was made yesterday by President Samora Machel during the 12th Session of the People's Assembly. The news was received with great satisfaction in the Fourth Congressional Hall, but the Mozambican chief of state warned those present of the need to redouble efforts to increase production of strategic goods for export, since we must still pay for the new plane. "We must catch more shrimp and produce more cashews and lumber in order to cover the cost of buying the plane, so that we can establish more air routes to India, Pakistan and even to the interior of the African continent. We will advance greatly, and we need only to produce oil, but this depends on our efforts as well," President Samora Machel said on this occasion. [Text] [Beira DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE in Portuguese 27 Apr 84 p 1] 5157

MAPUTO WARNS SWAZIS--Maputo--Mozambique has warned that it may block Swaziland's main rail link to the sea unless the Swazis take action against MNR activists. The warning coincides with the escalation of MNR activity in Mozambique and in the border areas of some of its neighbours. Although the Swaziland Government has said ANC insurgents were responsible for the derailling of the Swazi sugar train on May 17 as it crossed into Mozambique, Maputo blames the MNR according to well-informed sources. Besides causing trouble along the Swaziland border, the Mozambican rebels are said to have become a headache for Malawi. Last month a Malawi-bound train was attacked close to the border. Newly printed Malawian banknotes were taken from the train. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 24 May 84 p 3]

CSO: 3400/1078

SA SAID IN NAMIBIA FOR POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY REASONS

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English No 7, Apr 84 pp 41-43

[Article by Helmoed-Römer Heitman: "Why the Army Will Stay in Namibia"]

[Text]

HELMOED-RÖMER HEITMAN is a Cape Town businessman and a regular commentator — usually in professional journals — on military matters. Here he subjects the role of the SA Defence Force in Namibia to close scrutiny, and presents the contentious proposition that South Africa has to stay in Namibia precisely for moral and political reasons and despite military considerations. It is a pity that Heitman glibly falls for the usual right-wing fallacy of assuming that a militant liberation movement like Swapo is nothing more than a gang of criminals, but since that is the kind of approach taken by a good many of the people taking the decisions his argument remains important.

THE fall-out from Operation Askani brought with it something very unusual for the RSA — a measure of public debate of the issues involved. As much, this is a very welcome development indeed as the usual attitude of both press and public is one of abysmal lack of interest in and understanding of, defence and strategic matters. While thus deserving of encouragement, the debate unfortunately took on somewhat of an emotional note and thereby lost sight of the real issues. Perhaps some of the basic aspects should therefore be set out clearly.

The first is that one can indeed make a very strong argument that no useful military purpose is served by a continued SA presence in SWA and the semi-war in which this involves the SADF. The usual argument for this policy is a pseudo-military one that the RSA is "... bet-

ter off fighting on the SWA/Angola border than on the RSA/SWA border". As far as it goes, this is a perfectly logical and acceptable argument. Unfortunately it does not really apply in this case:

1. The full length of the RSA's borders was laid open to potential incursion and infiltration when Rhodesia fell to become Zimbabwe. The presence of SADF elements in northern SWA can thus have but little military effect on the security of the relatively short RSA/SWA border, let alone the longer RSA/Botswana border.
2. The real war for the RSA, should it come to such a pass, will be fought in the Transvaal and in the adjoining countries. It will certainly not be fought in the northern Cape.
3. The geographic realities of southern SWA and the northern Cape are such as to render this region singularly un-

attractive for military adventures of any kind. An attempt at insurgency in the northern Cape might well prove distressing to the local inhabitants, but it would hardly be more than inconvenient in national terms.

GIVEN these basic assumptions, the continued need to operate in northern SWA represents, at best, a nuisance to the SADF. At worst, this could prove a serious handicap – not in itself, but in the effect on the overall defence effort. What this conflict means to the SADF in hard military terms, can be summed up quite concisely:

1. It ties down troops many kilometres – and therefore many days – from where any real military threat to the RSA will materialise.
2. It swallows funds that would be far better spent making up for the years of neglect the SADF suffered from after the 1939-45 conflict until quite recent times. One thinks here of the serious existing and near-future gaps in its conventional capability.
3. It requires the SADF to call up CF and Commando members for periods of extended service, thereby causing a measure of economic disruption and also running down its effective reserve element. Any measure of economic disruption, in passing, is something a developing economy with a major job-creation problem can certainly well do without.
4. Like any low-intensity conflict, it cannot but harm the Army in particular by inculcating a rather casual and slapdash approach to war. This is not to criticise the SADF, which has been more successful than most in combatting this problem. It is simply an unavoidable side-effect of low-intensity conflict which allows the forces involved to 'get away with' mistakes, carelessness and negligence that would bring catastrophe in conventional war.
5. Finally, the relatively easily and cheaply gained successes could prove highly dangerous in the long term if they lead the SADF – and the government – to constitutionally and systematically underestimate both existing and potential hostile forces.

THOSE readers who have borne with the writer thus far and who have not yet consigned him to the outer wilds as an obvious local agent of either SWAPO or Mr Chernenko, will perhaps feel that he

has presented a strong argument for withdrawing from SWA with the greatest possible despatch. This would be to overlook one vital point: Very few wars indeed have ever been fought for a *military* purpose. The only ones that spring readily to mind are the German war against Russia from 1941 to 1945 and the Israeli war against her Arab neighbours in 1967. Both were launched at those particular times for an essentially military reason – to pre-empt a perceived threat of invasion. Most wars, however, are fought for a *political* purpose and it is here that the reasoning behind SA policy on SWA must be sought.

Quite what the exact reasoning within the Cabinet is that is felt to warrant the continued presence in SWA and the problems this brings with it, the writer cannot pretend to know. An educated estimate is, however, not too difficult to form:

1. While the SWA problem continues in more or less its present form, a good measure of hostile diplomatic and political attention that might otherwise be aimed directly at the RSA, is diverted to this question.
2. While this situation continues, it is possible for the RSA to trade concessions in this regard for consideration or favours in other matters.
3. Given the RSA's internal and international situation, can she afford to be perceived to 'give in' to an insurgency backed by the same sponsors who are backing insurgency against the RSA herself?

Moral consideration

QUITE apart from these possible political considerations, there are also strong moral considerations that argue for staying the course in SWA and not backing down from the basic posture maintained to date:

1. The so-called 'military wing' of SWAPO, the "People's Liberation Army of Namibia", is a technically definable and visibly terrorist organisation, identifiable as such by its own routine operational activities. Its continued targeting of the local civilian population for primary attention – not least by laying mines on open roads – further indicates that SWAPO itself has real doubts as to what measure of genuine support it

enjoys even among the Owambos who form its tribal base. Under these circumstances, even to consider handing over power to SWAPO would seem a morally shaky proposition at best. Negotiating anything but their surrender with any group of terrorists is hardly different to negotiating with ordinary criminals – they at least have the honesty not to hide their lust for power or financial gain behind a screen of ideological piffle.

2. The RSA has undertaken to defend the law-abiding majority of SWA citizens – regardless of their particular affiliation – against this terrorism. In the course of doing so, the SADF has lost a number of its men killed and wounded, as has the SAP and, more recently, the SWATF. A large number of PLAN's members have also lost their lives or health to the security forces and many civilians have been killed and hurt in the conflict. Does the RSA have the moral right to now simply decide that the game is no longer worth the candle, to write off this considerable sacrifice in lives and to abandon the law-abiding SWA citizen to SWAPO?

TO sum up. Certainly there is little if any pressing *military* purpose to the continued SA presence in SWA – but there are very sound *moral* and *political* reasons for this policy and war is, after all, merely a tool of politics. Finally there is an *indirect* military justification for this policy; to be perceived as having bowed to the pressure of terrorism in SWA, could only encourage those who seek to employ the same means against the RSA. In that sense, any capitulation would “bring the war closer”.

This brings us to the question of the operations conducted against PLAN elements in southern Angola. Given that there are sound political and moral reasons for a continued SA presence in SWA, there is no choice but to conduct such operations, to carry the war to the enemy. Striking at the enemy in his rear areas is almost always the most efficient approach. This is particularly so in counter-insurgency, where the enemy is very difficult indeed to find and fix anywhere else. Were the SADF not to strike at PLAN in this way, it and the government would morally be accessories to the murders of those civilians killed as a result of PLAN being able to operate more easily and effectively. Whether the timing or even the conduct of any parti-

cular cross-border operation has always been the best, is open to debate. The basic principle is not.

This argument can, in fact, be taken rather further than the RSA has thus far. It is eminently reasonable to argue that a country that aids and succours insurgents operating from its territory against another country is, in effect, waging a form of war against that country. On that basis the country suffering the attentions of the insurgency can decide, with the greatest measure of right on its side, that it has no recourse but to extend its defensive operations into tactically offensive operations against not merely the insurgents, but also their hosts. To deny this, is to deny the right to self defence simply because the attack is indirect.

The question of the Cubans and where in Angola they are at any given time, is not material to the above discussion except in as much as they could affect cross-border operations. It is, however, very relevant to the question of any future “free and fair” election in SWA. SWAPO will in any event enjoy the great advantage in such an election of being able to claim that only it can stop the war: “If we win we will stop laying mines, etc. If we lose, we will resume these activities. The fact that the ‘Boere’ cannot protect you, is shown by their having agreed to this election at all. If they could have defeated us they would have...”

SWAPO will be strengthened in this argument by the 50 km wide Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) that has been proposed as part of the settlement package. The problem here lies simply in the fact that this zone will include a very large proportion of the SWA population. To many of these people the withdrawal of the security forces will only mean that PLAN has defeated them. If to this situation is added the not so gentle hint that any election outcome other than a SWAPO victory will be attended by Cuban action to ‘correct’ it, the effect on a population thoroughly weary of war is only too obvious. Thus any election in SWA cannot be “free and fair” while the fear of terrorism still lingers and the shadow of intervention from the north remains.

The situation in which the RSA finds itself is thus somewhat complex in all its ramifications. In its essentials, however, it is simple: SA took on the man-

date to administer SWA to the benefit of its inhabitants. Under present circumstances, this has led to a decision to guide SWA to independence under a freely and fairly elected government — something not provided for under the original mandate. If the RSA wishes to honour these twin obligations, she cannot allow SWAPO to benefit from its policy of terrorism. Thus there is no choice but to continue operations against PLAN until it ceases to be a serious threat or until SWAPO is willing to participate in an election after a ceasefire sufficiently lengthy to allow the fear of its terrorism to subside. Until then, also, Angola will have to live with SADF operations in its southern regions unless it chooses to rid itself of PLAN. ●

CSO: 3400/1000

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWAPO SAID TO SA'S ADVANTAGE

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 5 May 84 p 38

[Article by Gwen Lister in the column "Gwen Lister Looks at the Political Scene": "Anti-Swapo Propaganda Intensifies"]

[Text] The propaganda onslaught against the Swapo movement in recent months, appears to be greater than ever before. This renewed onslaught is even more ironic when viewed against the background of the acceptance of Resolution 435, as well as the internal initiative, namely the 'multi party conference', which also claims to be in favour of the implementation of the said Resolution.

But this renewed onslaught on Swapo only serves to make the sceptic more dubious, and neither does it indicate a genuine desire for a settlement, either on the part of South Africa, or the 'multi party conference' for that matter.

The anti-Swapo propaganda campaign was given new impetus after the release of Swapo found member, Mr Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, from 16 years imprisonment on Robben Island.

The plan had backfired on the South Africans, said some. While Toivo's release was a strategic one for various reasons (it is evident following both his and the release of Mr Willibald Saggarias, there have been no additional political prisoners who have been given their freedom, although it was said at the time that the Namibian political prisoners would be released from time to time) it was apparent that pro-South African forces had been counting on Toivo either giving a nod of acceptance to the MPC or challenging the leadership of Swapo President, Mr Sam Nujoma.

Propaganda in Earnest

Neither of these succeeded, and although much of the media gave, and continues to give publicity to a 'pending split' in the Swapo movement, to their great chagrin, this has not come about. When it became evident that Mr ya Toivo's commitments were unchanged, the propaganda onslaught, and the attempts at belittling this man, started in earnest.

And those belittling him, those attacking and criticising his every move, were those who claimed to have sought his release in the first place!

It has become evident, over the past few years, that any, and I repeat any, attempt on the part of the South African Government to implement an alternative to Resolution 435, the more she clamps down on the Swapo movement. Which is hardly the precursor to any 'free and fair' election.

It has become quite evident, to the majority of people in this country, that the 'multi party conference' is a last ditch effort to avoid a Swapo government in Namibia.

Alternatives Failed

If the 'multi party conference' cannot succeed in bringing about a reasonable alternative to Resolution 435, then nothing else will. For we have a history of attempts, on the part of South Africa, to install an alternative government - all of which have failed. The 'multi party conference' offers them their last hope, for it is ostensibly an initiative on the part of local political parties, rather than the South Africans, and so, in their eyes, so much more likely to succeed.

Even the South African Government is fully cognisant that the 'multi party conference' has major flaws: the former DTA government was described by Mr P. W. Botha, South African Prime Minister, as 'unrepresentative' and in this sense too, the 'multi party conference' has its deficiencies.

While the authorities do not (and this is quite evident by the propaganda onslaught alone) want the Swapo movement as a whole to be represented in the MPC, they would have been delighted had Toivo's release brought about a split in that movement, the more moderate section of which would have joined up with the MPC. From a point of view of offering a 'credible' alternative to Resolution 435, this, for the South Africans, would have been the ideal solution.

Naturally, it would also have been required that parties such as the Damara Council, and possibly a more united Swanu, remain part of this initiative, in order to guarantee success.

Detrimental to South Africa

But the propaganda onslaught against Swapo is, in a sense, most detrimental to the South Africans themselves. One would have thought they would have learned from past mistakes. After years of conflict with both Angola and Mocambique, South Africa has finally arrived at the conference table.

The same will apply when a Swapo government comes to power in Namibia. For the result of the propaganda onslaught on Swapo, is increased polarisation between Swapo and the whites of this country. This, at present, is of course exactly what the South Africans want.

Alienating the Swapo movement, by means of consistent propaganda excursions on the part of South Africa, will only result in a mass exodus of whites from an independent Namibia under a Swapo flag. This too, is probably what South Africa wants.

They realise only too well the effect on an independent Namibia, of a mass exodus of whites, including civil servants. Almost total devastation would be the result.

This of course, is consistent with her policies in Angola and Mocambique. First she successfully destabilised the above-mentioned countries, bringing them to their knees both literally and figuratively, and then she leads them to the conference table.

SA Will Have Her Way

This is probably most exactly what she plans for an independent Namibia under a Swapo government. For a white exodus will result in economic chaos in Namibia, this is almost certain, for no liberation movement would be equipped with the necessary skilled labour to take over immediately. And then, probably, South Africa will have her way.

For then she will be in a position to dictate. As she is today in a position to dictate to both Angola and Mocambique, although most people conveniently forget that it was South Africa, primarily, which brought them to their knees in the first place.

Now she plays the role of 'liberator' and 'peacemaker extraordinaire' in southern Africa. After her troops had virtually denuded the south of Angola over the years in a policy of destabilisation the South Africans now prepare to move out, accompanied by great media fanfare, and much publicity given to the manner in which South Africa and Fapla soldiers now walk together through the bush in a withdrawal from a country she should never have been in in the first place.

It is not to the benefit of South Africa to have an unstable country on her borders. Since she realises she will sit down one day, and negotiate with the Swapo movement, why does she not do it now, and avert future chaos?

Talking to 'Terrorists'

For after all, years ago, the South Africans themselves would have scoffed if it had been speculated that one day they would sit down at the same table with the MPLA, the very same people the South Africans have referred to as 'terrorists' in the past.

South Africa is fully aware that the chances are, in the event of an internationally supervised election, that Swapo will come to power. She is also aware that her 'alternatives' in the past have not succeeded. Talks with Swapo now, would in all likelihood prevent a lot of bloodshed in the future.

The recent bomb attacks in Oshakati, and the resultant press statements by South Africa, are proof enough of the extravagant propaganda war on which they have embarked: Swapo was blamed only hours after the explosion. There was and still is no concrete evidence to prove that they were responsible for the blast. Added to this, denials came from all quarters of the Swapo movement.

Notwithstanding, the South Africans continued with their propaganda exploits. The Americans were more cautious, and have not pointed a finger. But South Africa has the audacity to claim it is Swapo, while we have still several unsolved bomb explosions, all of which were attributed to the Swapo movement at the time, with no proof whatsoever.

Most liberation movements, such as the PLO and IRA, quickly claim responsibility in the case of similar incidents. If Swapo were responsible, surely they would have done the same and claimed another 'military success'?

The fact remains however, that Namibians want peace. Presumably most South Africans want peace too. We cannot afford continued war, and we cannot afford a white exodus at independence.

The South Africans, and only the South Africans, can determine the way in which independence will come about in this country, and whether it will be a bloody, or peaceful transition.

Propaganda

Rather than making propaganda out of a horrific incident, such as the bomb which killed the two diplomats and an Ovambo-speaking businessman, the South Africans, who have been 'big enough' to seek reconciliation with their neighbours, can seek reconciliation with the Swapo movement too.

The incident was an horrific one, and whether it was a Soviet-made bomb or South African, makes no difference whatsoever: people died unnecessarily, and if talks between Swapo and South Africa can prevent this sort of occurrence, then the two sides should sit down and talk.

CSO: 3400/1000

RESULTS OF LUSAKA MEETING ANALYZED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 11, 23 May 84 pp 5-7

[Article: "Namibia: Rake's Progress"]

[Text]

The result of the 11-13 May Lusaka conference between SWAPO, South Africa and the *Multi Party Conference* (MPC) was inconclusive. But the basic parameters of an agenda have emerged. President **Kenneth Kaunda**, who co-chaired the formal conference sessions with the Namibian administrator-general, **Willie van Niekerk**, is determined to maintain the impetus which brought the parties together. Both SWAPO and Pretoria are prepared to resume talks in the near future, probably at a lower level. And in contrast to the bitterness that surrounded the break up of the Geneva conference on Namibia in January 1981, neither SWAPO nor Pretoria has blamed the other side in overtly hostile terms for the failure to agree the declaration on Namibian independence drafted by Kaunda.

SWAPO and South Africa have made concessions, partly tactical. The broad differences have been identified: implementation of Resolution 435, the role of Cuban troops in Angola, and the position of the MPC internal parties in the run-up to independence. In further contrast to Geneva, both SWAPO and the South Africans have extracted some political capital from Lusaka. SWAPO, by including in its Lusaka delegation representatives of other Namibian parties which have broken from the MPC, was able to demonstrate its claim to be the most powerful and representative Namibian political party. Pretoria gained an advantage from having the MPC accepted as a distinct presence at the talks even though SWAPO maintained its position that it was negotiating only with South Africa. Neither side realised its maximum goals: for SWAPO the signing of a formal ceasefire with Niekerk as an immediate step towards

implementation of 435, for South Africa the cajoling of SWAPO to agree to cease fighting and join an interim all-party government without committing itself to any definite timetable for a UN-supervised settlement.

Prior to the Lusaka meeting, the South African foreign minister, 'Pik' Botha, told the South African parliament in Cape Town that South Africa would be prepared to negotiate independence with "a government of national unity" in Namibia. South Africa's head of military intelligence, Gen. Hennie van der Westhuizen, made a specific offer along these lines to Nujoma in Lusaka in February. Such a deal was also discussed at a meeting in Lusaka between Nujoma and 'Pik' Botha at the end of April.

Nujoma's reaction was that SWAPO was not prepared to enter into any deal with the MPC in the absence of a commitment by Pretoria to a clear timetable for Namibian independence. Crucially, Nujoma did not rule out altogether the idea of some form of unity pact between SWAPO and at least some of the MPC prior to independence elections. And Pretoria conveyed its view that in such circumstances it would not necessarily insist on linkage of Namibian independence to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Some within SWAPO, including the influential secretary for information, Hidipo Hamutenya, are in favour of SWAPO's absorption of other parties as a means to SWAPO's eventual emergence as the sole party.

The significance of the South African offer is its confirmation that Pretoria now accepts that an internal settlement in Namibia excluding SWAPO is impossible. Pretoria still wants, of course, to obtain a Namibian settlement on its own terms - that is, acceptable to the bulk of the *National Party's* white supporters in South Africa and with a Namibian government prepared to recognise that it would have to accept a non-aggression pact with Pretoria. Thus, while South Africa is still trying to promote the MPC as a distinct political entity, this no longer seems to be in order to prepare the ground for an internal settlement, but to increase the diplomatic pressure on SWAPO to come to some accommodation with the MPC in advance of independence.

At Lusaka Nujoma signalled a clear shift from the previous SWAPO attitude of outright hostility to the MPC as "puppets". In his opening statement he appealed to "all the Namibian patriots and fellow compatriots" to "examine their commitment to the cause of Namibia's independence" in order to lay the foundations "of a new nation". He went on to urge "all Namibians" to join in demanding the unconditional implementation of 435 as the basis for

independence. SWAPO's willingness to make a clear overture to the MPC leaders to join it in presenting a united front to South Africa has further weakened the MPC's cohesion.

Herman Toivo's presence has certainly helped SWAPO appeal to a broader spectrum of Namibian opinion. (AC Vol 25 No 8). SWAPO's delegation included **Justus Garoeb**, leader of the *Damara Council*, and leaders of the *South West African National Union* (SWANU) including **Norah Chase**, SWANU secretary-general, and former president **Gerson Veii**, both of whom have broken with SWANU president **Moses Katjuongwa**. And *Namibian Christian Democrat* (NCD) leader, **Hans Robr**, a German-speaking white who has been outspoken in his condemnation of excesses by South African security forces, especially the notorious Koevoet "crowbar" special counter-insurgency unit, was most conciliatory towards SWAPO. Though the NDC is small, its affinity with the SWAPO delegation is attracting some support from the indigenous white community. (The NDC had two seats in the defunct National Assembly elected in 1979).

Katjuongwa, whose days as SWANU president are probably numbered, SWAPO-democrat leader **Andreas Shipanga** and black leaders within the *Democratic Turnhalle Alliance*, are fully aware that SWAPO's successful wooing of new allies has critically diminished whatever political credibility the MPC ever had inside Namibia as "an alternative force" to SWAPO. Though Shipanga, who was shunned by SWAPO at Lusaka, is unlikely to join SWAPO in the near future, others probably will. The refusal of the MPC to sign the Kaunda draft declaration at Lusaka unless a clause refuting Cuban linkage was withdrawn, has added dissension within the MPC. We understand that the refusal to sign was at the insistence of DTA chairman, **Dirk Mudge** and the leader of the *National Party of Namibia* delegation, **Eben van Zijl**. Black MPC leaders resented being made to toe the line on linkage.

SWAPO's clearest signal that it is prepared to be flexible over implementation of a 435-based settlement was Nujoma's reference to SWAPO's and South Africa's acceptance of the "Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia" *together* with 435. These were drafted by the Western contact group of five in 1981 in a bid to reactivate negotiations after the failure of the Geneva conference. US assistant secretary of state for African Affairs **Chester Crocker**, who largely authored the proposals, first presented them to SWAPO and the front line states in October of that year to an initially negative reaction (AC Vol 22 No 25). They constitute

a set of guidelines, covering Namibia's fundamental political shape, to be agreed prior to implementation of independence and the holding of elections. The most crucial points are 1) that the constitution of an independent Namibia should be determined by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly elected by a pre-independence election, 2) that after independence the executive and legislature should be constituted by periodic elections under universal suffrage and a secret ballot (ie any attempt to set up a one party state would be barred), and 3) that there should be protection from arbitrary protection of private property or deprivation of property without just and prompt compensation.

The protracted hassle over the suggestion for a part first-past-the-post/proportional electoral system was eventually resolved by SWAPO's agreement by the end of 1982 to the selection of either one or other type of electoral system. These proposals have never been formally incorporated in 435, though they were contained in subsequent reports by the UN secretary-general setting out the areas of agreement reached in the negotiations. SWAPO's confirmation that it has indeed accepted these principles as part and parcel of a 435-based settlement is in many ways remarkable as it follows months of public denigration of the contact group and all its work. It is also another reason why the game as Pretoria sees it is now one of tying SWAPO down to specifics of a post-independant power-structure rather than seeking to exclude it from power.

Pretoria wants to be sure that these arrangements will stick after independence by trying to ensure that the MPC parties will have a foothold of power within a SWAPO-led independence government. In this context linkage ceases to be a prerequisite from Pretoria's point of view for a settlement, though at present it remains one for the Americans. The key test will be the scheduled completion of the South African-Angolan disengagement process by the beginning of June. The constraints this places on SWAPO's ability to continue an effective guerrilla war will probably ensure a further round of negotiations in the near future, despite SWAPO's claim that it was misled by Pretoria and Kaunda into believing a ceasefire would be negotiated at Lusaka. The Reagan administration appears to realise it is becoming isolated even from Pretoria on linkage.

The US would hardly be in a position to hold out for linkage if all the parties directly involved in the dispute agreed on a formula which effectively meant its downgrading. This would happen if some form of joint declaration of independence were to be adopted by SWAPO and the MPC as well as a specific commitment to Namibia's non-alignment

and a Nkomati-style non-aggression pact - an idea floated in the contact group's "Non-Paper" drafted at the same time as the constitutional proposals. US diplomats are beginning to devise a face-saving position if linkage falls flat on its face - increasingly likely since the Cubans and Angolans say there will be no withdrawal prior to the US elections in November.

However, SWAPO is likely to resist further attempts to persuade it to sign a joint declaration with MPC. SWAPO prefers to wait for a further weakening of the MPC, thus enabling SWAPO to deal with individual "allied" parties. The MPC is now touring conservative African states, including **Gabon, Togo, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Morocco** and may also be in Europe at the same time as **P.W. Botha**.

The significance of the MPC visit to conservative African states is that the latter are among those which would provide a pan-African peace-keeping force for Namibia, with the existing Angolan-South African Joint Military Council (JMC) as the nucleus. While Pretoria is resigned to an internationally-acceptable independence process, it wants to avoid the arrival of a UN peace keeping force. This is one of the main issues Botha will be discussing with **Margaret Thatcher** and other Western leaders early next month ●

CSO: 3400/1060

MUDGE SCORED FOR 'FORGETTING' TURNHALLE CONCEPT

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 28 Apr 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Root of Evil"]

[Text]

Dirk Mudge and his political associates seem to have no knowledge of the recent past which they have conveniently forgotten, and shoved to the background in the full knowledge that South West Africa is not noted for a long memory after having been inundated with countless political plans which amounted to super abortions.

The idea of getting political parties and groups together with the professed objective of discussions to find a way out of what appears to be everlasting mire, is laudable; but once that plan is the product of Mr Dirk Mudge who in turn receives his instructions from South Africa, it is yet another abortion.

The bulk of South West African people have lost heart in these endless talks, these endless succession of new political blueprints which in the end turn out to be just another political manoeuvre. For at the basis of these plans is South Africa. She fathers the idea, directs the course of it, and then decides whether or not it should have a demise, whereafter she blames South West Africa for her helpless leaders and her lack of an objective!

She has no shame in doing so, also forgetting that she is the controller of South West Africa since June 1915, and that all the political blueprints for our country either emanated from Pretoria, or had to be approved by Pretoria when they were devised locally.

Like the Turnhalle concept. The big 'victory' in December 1978, and let us not fool ourselves for there was a lot of enthusiasm and support for that Alliance, went down the drain? Why, Mr Mudge? After your commendable work, after the political humiliations you had to suffer to rise and to state openly that South West Africa's dark-skinned people deserve a new deal placing them on a par with the white man, you allowed the greatest opportunity yet in the hands of a politician in this country to slip through your fingers.

And how did you do it? By allowing the dictates from South Africa who forged the plan, allowed it to run for

a while but harnessed and tied to old and rotten and unwanted concepts such as ethnicity, and then to scrap it when it suited Pretoria.

And the same sickness, the same weariness, the same lack of vision and drive, are burdening the Multi-Party Conference. It is an instrument of South Africa. And it is doomed, its future fate even more ignominious than the Turnhalle.

Can't you see that only a political plan which rests on the foundation of a South West Africa nationalism has any chance of leading us somewhere? Can't you people realise that you have two alternatives: Incorporation into South Africa as a fifth province, or a true national state?

The road to a national state is to recognise national objectives, being an undivided allegiance in an undivided country; the unremitting pursuing of a common educational policy for all, and one official language; an uncompromising stance in respect of the country's natural resources.

Ride that tired old horse Mr Mudge. Keep riding it, for the many good deeds you have done this country will go unrewarded and forgotten, overshadowed by your lack of being an uncompromising South West Africa nationalist.

The country at large is tired, and sick to put it mildly, that political action in this country consists of dancing to the South African tune and dictates, and to shout abuse at SWAPO.

Both these practices constitute a road leading nowhere. SWAPO can only be countered with a nationalistic blueprint as fervent as the SWAPO programme.

Listening to the dictates of South Africa, should in the alternative be substituted with incorporation into South Africa. We cannot continue on the road to nowhere, while foreign interests are picking our country to the bone.

MPC URGED TO INFORM PUBLIC ON DISCUSSIONS

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 25 May 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Lift the Wraps Off"]

[Text] June 13 is budget day and this country has not progressed from the social and fiscal morass it was in at the same time last year.

The economy is in a shambles and uncertainty is becoming like a perennial, terminal disease.

The nation that has never been, is wracked with dissension and disunity.

Namibians are becoming more and more cynical about institutions that, in sane and stable societies, are sacred.

This is a dangerous omen for a society that will have to tread alone into the 21st century.

The Multiparty Conference is due to return tomorrow and they will report back.

Now they have delivered their Declaration of Intent and their Bill of Rights, they should come out into the open and remove the wraps of secrecy from their discussions.

The people of Namibia who have the right to self-determination also have a right to know what is being determined for them.

CSO: 3400/1000

COLUMNIST EXAMINES BANNING OF COURT CASE

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 5 May 84 p 38

[Article by Gwen Lister in the column "Gwen Lister Looks at the Political Scene": "It is Indeed Frightening"]

[Text]

The effective banning of a court case by the South African State President has been wildly condemned both in Namibia and abroad. In Windhoek the Bar Council described the action as "deplorable"; Mrs Helen Suzman, official Opposition spokesman on Law and Order, said the banning represented a "vast abuse of ministerial powers", and most members of the legal profession approached were unanimous in their condemnation of the banning.

In May 1978, the South African Defence Force launched a raid on Cassinga on what they described as two Swapo bases named Moscow and Vietnam in southern Angola. Swapo claimed that a refugee camp or transit base at Cassinga had been bomb-

ed, and hundreds killed and taken prisoner.

It transpired only some time after the raid, that prisoners had in fact been taken by the South African Defence Force, and that these people, estimated at the time to be in the vicinity of 200, were being held at a secret camp near Mariental.

An aerial picture of the camp, which was to appear in the Windhoek Observer, had to be removed from the pages, and a blanket of secrecy shrouded what was described by many as a "concentration camp", and about which little was known at the time.

SOON LEAKED OUT

However, reports on the camp soon began to leak out in the overseas press. The International Red Cross was later granted access to the detainees there, which improved circumstances somewhat, for at least in some cases, (where possible) contact was made with the families of the detainees, most of whom were unaware of whether their relatives were dead or

alive. The South African authorities seldom seem to bother with what they obviously regard as a 'trivial chore' of informing families of a detainee's whereabouts.

On August 5, 1978, I wrote in my weekly column that "although rumours about what actually happened during the South African raid on Cassinga in Angola, are rife in Windhoek, one of these rumours is that many of the people believed to have been killed at Cassinga, are in actual fact being held in detention..."

At first there was a thorough blanket of secrecy over the detention camp itself, as well as the detainees being held there.

At one stage I called upon the South African authorities to either issue the names of the detainees being held there, or at least to inform their families of their detention. This however was not done, and this task was left to the International Red Cross once they had gained access to the camp.

CLOSE-MOUTHED ABOUT CAMP

Notwithstanding this

fact however, Red Cross spokesmen were close-mouthed about Mariental, and at no stage were they prepared to make detailed reports available to the press or public, mainly because they would have lost access to the camp, and the prisoners would have lost their 'privilege', if the Red Cross had 'talked' about conditions in the camp.

The International Red Cross of course, could at no stage be blamed for this fact, because, if they had been faced with the choice of revealing information about conditions at the Mariental detention camp, as opposed to retaining their access to the prisoners, and thus being able to assist detainees as far as possible, obviously the latter course was more advisable.

It was only this year, with the preparation of a motion which called upon the Minister of Defence, the Administrator General, the Officer Commanding the SWA Territory Force and Major G.J. Coetzee, officer in charge of the Mariental detention camp, to furnish information as to whether the 37 detainees in question were under arrest; on what charges they had been arrested; and why they were being detained, that more details about the camp, although still sparse, were revealed.

The detainees, most of whom are women, and thus giving more credence to the Swapo view that Cassinga was a refugee camp or transit camp rather than a headquarters for Swapo as the Defence Force claimed, have been held for six years without trial.

WHAT CHARGES?

It is not known, of those detainees held at Mariental, how many are 'civilians' and how many are captured insurgents, but it is presumed that insurgents would have been brought to trial. But if the majority are civilians, as is suspected, then there is little they can be charged with, apart from having left the country illegally. Whatever the case may be, the Courts should be allowed to decide, and if no legal grounds for their detention can be established, then they should be released.

The Defence Force had already confirmed that the detainees were being held in terms of Proclamation AG 9 as amended. It is obvious therefore, that the Administrator General must have endorsed their detention every 30 days, for a period of six years.

I was of the opinion (perhaps erroneously) that Proclamation AG 9 applied only to 'security districts', which as far as I am aware, encompasses the area from Windhoek (inclusive) northwards.

At present, as was pointed out in the statement by the SWA Bar Council, security legislation in this country is being investigated by a Commission of Inquiry, and apart from this, the 'multi party conference' has only recently issued a 'bill of rights' - and such occurrences are made farcical by the 'banning' order of the State President.

I am not a legal person, nor do I have legal knowledge of the ramifications of either the

Defence Act of 1975, or Proclamation AG 9, but the fact remains, as the Bar Council pointed out in its statement: that "persons who have been already deprived of their liberty for six years, can arbitrarily be detained for as long as the authorities may deem fit". Equally frightening is the fact that a matter can be taken out of the jurisdiction of a court of law.

NO RECOURSE TO LAW

Whatever the other aspects involved in this case, such as whether the detainees were unlawfully abducted by the South African Defence Force from a neighbouring state or not, or whether they are prisoners-of-war, one aspect remains abundantly clear: these people have been held against their will for an extensive period of six years, with no recourse to a court trial.

On purely humanitarian grounds alone, the banning of the court case by the State President, deserves widespread condemnation.

I may point out here, that in the past, certain people have been sentenced to far less than six years imprisonment for horrendous crimes.

As several legal personalities pointed out this week: they were not asking for the reasons of the Mariental detainees, but merely that they be granted a court trial.

The excuse that it is against the national interest to allow the court case to proceed, is no excuse at all. Their continued detention trial represents a serious violation of human rights.

WHITE SWAPO MEMBER RECEIVES DEATH THREATS

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 18 May 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by Peter Kenny]

[Text] Mr Anton Lubowski, the Windhoek advocate who formed part of the SWAPO delegation at last weekend's Lusaka talks, has been subject to death threats by white extremists.

Mr Lubowski, the first prominent white Namibian to openly admit membership of SWAPO in recent years, urged other whites to follow him on his return from Lusaka.

"Since my return from Lusaka I have received a number of death threats and nonstop calls insulting me for my move," Mr Lubowski told THE ADVERTISER today.

Three of the threats had come from people claiming to represent the Witweerstandsbeweging (WWB) or the White Resistance Movement.

"But I have also been inundated with messages of support and congratulations from friends and colleagues," said Mr Lubowski.

He quoted from a letter he received yesterday from a fellow advocate which said:

"Congratulations! I wish you good luck in your struggle. May God protect you."

Following his announced support for SWAPO, Mr Lubowski has also had a number of cases in which he was representing people in both civil and criminal matters, withdrawn from him.

The owner of one of the shops in the Hepworths Arcade yesterday, came out in support of Mr Lubowski, saying:

"You have got to admire him. I don't know what people are making such a fuss about because all that Anton has done is merely openly supporting a cause he has long been associated with.

"There are lots of whites who support him but who feel they cannot make an open expression like him. Somebody had to start the ball rolling."

The owner of the shop asked not to be named.

Mr Lubowski said he would report the matter to the Police and might ask the Police officially to tap his phone in order to apprehend those terrorising him and his family.

One of the threats said: "You pig. We will kill you."

Some of the threats had been aimed against Mr Lubowski and his family.

He is married with two young children.

The mouthpiece of the DTA, the REPUBLIKEIN, has run a relentless campaign against Mr Lubowski since he left as part of the SWAPO delegation for Lusaka.

He has featured in every cartoon in the newspaper since last Thursday.

Two advocates, who may not be named for professional reasons, said yesterday they admire Mr Lubowski's stand and said it was "ridiculous" that instructing briefs should be withdrawn from him by attorneys.

"Every second lawyer in this town is active in politics and just because he is white and supporting a legal political party, SWAPO, suddenly he is an ogre.

The RAND DAILY MAIL Africa Bureau today quoted Dr Jan Spies, editor of the REPUBLIKEIN as denying he was waging a hate campaign against Mr Lubowski.

Dr Spies commented:

"But he must accept joint responsibility for terrorism and must say where he stands on it.

"We make no bones about the fact that we support the MPC, and in this context we must see Lubowski as an opponent."

Mr Lubowski reiterated:

"I stand by my commitment. I would not have made this move if I did not believe fully in it. Judging by the calls of support I have received, I think there are many more white people who feel the way I do, but don't yet want to come out into the open."

WHITE MEMBER OF SWAPO REPLIES TO ACCUSATIONS

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 5 Jun 84 p 5

[Letter by Anton Lubowski in the column "Readers Letters": "Lubowski Replies to the Charges"]

[Text]

Dear Sigi,

In reply to your open letter addressed to me in three different newspapers, the following:

● I agree with you that my calling as an advocate calls me to ensure right and justice to my fellowmen.

That is exactly what I have tried to put into practice in my professional career as an advocate as well as my political beliefs and actions.

You know as well as I know of the many cases where torture and maltreatment of Swapo people by the Security Police have been alleged and proved.

You also know about the Kakuva trial where the court found that Kakuva died at the hands of the Security Police after being assaulted and that the court remarked that people who act in such a way cannot have the human interest at heart.

You also know, Sigi, about many innocent people including women and children that have been killed by the SADF.

What about eg the refugee camp at Cassinga that was attacked in 1978 where hundreds of women and children were killed and buried in a mass grave?

What about the deaths at the old location in 1959 and many others?

You know as well as I do that I can mention many more examples of the atrocities committed to the people of this country by the SADF, Koevoet and the Security Police.

● I thank you for your recognition of my efforts with the Lüderitz Peace Prize.

Exactly that should be proof to you that what I am interested in at this stage is to assist in bringing peace to our country.

May I remind you that Swapo offered for many years to sign a ceasefire with SA immediately.

It was inter alia offered in Geneva in 1981 and now in Lusaka and that offer still stands.

You know also, that it is SA that has the power in this country and it is SA that is not interested to sign a ceasefire with Swapo.

This again became clear in Lusaka.

SA wants to avoid an election in Namibia at all costs and is therefore not interested in a ceasefire and consequently not interested to bring peace to this country.

The reason for this attitude by SA should be clear to you.

● Let me correct you, I have never been a member nor a supporter of Swapo-D.

I was a member of the Federal Party for approximately 1 year at the time lead by Advocate O'Linn.

I resigned in protest in 1979 when there was a strong possibility that the Party would join the Constituent Assembly.

I predicted that it was dominated by SA, and I was right.

● You say that Swapo wants to destroy our historical past!

I want to refer you to the speech delivered by the President of Swapo at the Lusaka Conference where he said that Swapo will forget the past in the name of unity and conciliation and will open a new chapter which will be characterised by a democratic society in which property rights, human rights and civil liberties will be protected and guaranteed under the law.

● The oath all Namibians have to take to be loyal to SA in order to practise as a lawyer and/or to obtain a SA passport is the detestable and unfortunate part of the colonial system we live under.

Whether you are a member of Swapo or the National Party, you have no choice in the matter. We are forced by circumstances to do so.

My oath to Swapo on the contrary is, totally voluntary and apart from that something that I believe in and to an organisation that I know through personal experience for many years is committed to bring success and prosperity to the country and people I love.

The MPC leaders whom I also know personally certainly do not have that commitment.

You would have felt ashamed, Sigi, of the MPC leaders in Lusaka when the President of the Republic of Zambia asked them not

to "tempt him because he did not want to have second thoughts" about them.

Also when he called on the AG to bring "serious-minded people" with him should he come again to the Conference.

When they were asked to decide on independence for our country they said that they had no mandate from their supporters to make such a decision and they will have to go back to Windhoek to get such a mandate!

Could there be doubt in any person's mind which organisation has the interest of this country and its people at heart?

I thank you and invite you to become a member too.

GAROE: MPC NOW A SA TOOL

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 28 May 84 p 3

[Text]

THE MULTIPARTY Conference was no longer an authentic initiative of local Namibian leaders, Mr Justus Garoeb, leader of the Damara Council, told a mass rally in Katutura yesterday.

About 2 000 people attended a Damara Council meeting supported by parties in the pro-Swapo alliance.

The rally took place at the Katutura Junior School sportsgrounds.

The SA Government was, said Mr Garoeb, now able to manipulate the MPC.

Chants of 'One Namibia, One Nation' came from the masses, as Mr Garoeb addressed them on current issues emanating from the Lusaka meeting.

Explaining his participation in the MPC which he left two months ago, Mr Garoeb said he and Swanu President, Mr Moses Katjiuongua, started an all-party conference to work towards the speedy implementation of Resolution 435.

"We (Swanu and the Damara Council), met on the farm Rüdenau between Windhoek and Okahandja with one aim: the speedy independence of Namibia".

Mr Garoeb said other parties including the DTA, the National Party, Swapo-Democrats and the Rehoboth Liberation Front, joined the initiative.

"But suddenly, following secret midnight phonecalls between the SA Prime Minister's office in Cape Town, the Administrator General's office in Windhoek and Dirk Mudge who initially had reservations about joining,

the initiative was taken out of our hands by SA."

All decisions taken in the MPC were watered down and it became a tool of the SA Government, so he opted out, Mr Garoeb said.

"After the Damara Council left the MPC, I was accused of being bribed by Swapo and of not giving reasons for my move.

"The truth is, my final speech in the MPC which explained my reasons for leaving, was succinct even to a point of driving Mr Eben Van Zijl of the NP out of the meeting twice," Mr Garoeb said.

Mr Garoeb praised the Swapo leader, Mr Sam Nujoma, as a "true son of Namibia with a heart of gold".

Mr Simson Gobs of the Damara Council at the same venue, called for the SA Government to allow Swapo to hold public meetings.

WINDHOEK OBSERVER TO FIGHT PUBLICATIONS BOARD BANNING

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 28 May 84 p 1

[Text]

TWO MORE EDITIONS OF THE Windhoek Observer have been banned by the South African Publications Board, but the newspaper is to fight back and appeal.

On Friday, the Editor of the Windhoek Observer, Mr Hannes Smith, received a telegram from the SA Publications Board saying the May 12 and May 19 editions of the Observer had been banned.

They were found undesirable in terms of Section 4 of the Publications Act, Sub-section 11 (2).

The contents in that paper were found to be undesirable in terms of Section 47 (2) (E) of the SA Act.

Mr Smith said he had been informed the stated reason for the banning of the papers was they were "prejudicial to the safety of the State".

"But we are not going to take this lying down.

"We knew when they banned our Friday girl the unremitting campaign against us would not stop.

"We are therefore seeking legal advice with a view to appeal to get the banning overturned," Mr Smith said with a tremor in his voice.

In last Friday's edition of the Observer, Mr Smith reported on his front page: "We suspect in the absence of sex pictures or articles, the reason for these two banning orders is our coverage of the Lusaka circus".

The Observer earlier had five consecutive issues banned, creating a dangerous precedent for the paper.

In the past, when a newspaper has been banned four times, it has sometimes been permanently banned.

The Southern African Society of Journalists (SASJ) at its annual congress in Johannesburg during the weekend, condemned the banning.

It criticised the SA Publications Board and the Newspaper Press Union, which represents newspaper owners.

The SASJ said the NPU was "helping expose the newspaper to attacks".

The resolution was passed unanimously on Saturday and the Society said the Publications Control Board's reasons for the latest bannings were "spurious".

"The SASJ believes the real motivations for the bannings was to suppress an outspoken and courageous voice of political opposition.

"The potential destruction of the Windhoek Observer would be a great loss to press freedom and to Southern African journalism as a whole," the resolution said.

It noted, the bannings were made possible by the withdrawal of the Observer from the NPU.

This withdrawal was the result of an NPU decision to censure the Observer.

"The SASJ believes that the NPU, in censuring the Windhoek Observer, has played a role in exposing it to attack by the State, and has strengthened the forces against it.

CS0: 3400/1060

BRIEFS

AWB AFFILIATION BANNED--House of Assembly--Members of the South African Defence Force are not allowed to belong to the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, said last Wednesday. Answering a question from Mr Jan Hoon (CP Kuruman) on behalf of the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, Mr Le Grange denied the SADF followed a policy which permitted the promotion only of officers holding certain political affiliations. Mr AF Fouche (CP Witbank) then asked Mr Le Grange what the Government's policy was towards SADF members joining the AWB whose leader, Mr Eugene Terre- Blanche, gave a controversial salute at the recent inauguration of the Afrikanervolkswag organisation in Pretoria. Mr le Grange said: "It is the Government's policy that members of the Defence Force may not be members of the AWB."--Sapa [Text] [Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 5 Jun 84 p 4]

NUJOMA 25 MAY STATEMENT--Dakar, Senegal--Mr Sam Nujoma, leader of SWAPO said his guerillas "are not fighting against whites, but against a system--apartheid," and that SWAPO is still ready to negotiate with South Africa. The guerillas are ready to sign a ceasefire agreement with SA to begin negotiations on the basis of UN resolutions, Mr Nujoma told a news conference last Friday night. The SWAPO leader contended the conference on Namibia held two weeks ago in Lusaka was "sabotaged" by the South Africans and its "puppets of the Multiparty Conference" which regroups internal parties in the Territory. Mr Nujoma also severely criticised the Reagan Administration saying its political engagement was supporting the racist regime in Pretoria. Comparing the Carter and Reagan Administrations, Mr Nujoma said President Carter's attitude was less pronounced against SWAPO, whereas Mr Reagan has openly aided the SA Government.--Sapa--AP [Text] [Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 28 May 84 p 1]

COPPER MINING EQUIPMENT--The O'Kiep Copper Company in SWA has recently taken delivery of three Mission 6200U Megamatic underground percussion drill rigs supplied by Industrial Machinery Supplies (IMS) of Johannesburg. According to IMS group marketing manager Mr Danie Ellis, the track mounted hydraulic powered rotary percussion rigs, used in conjunction with 17 Bar booster compressors, form a complete and efficient drilling package for the underground applications. "The rigs are primarily designed for drilling 165 mm holes in hard rock formations to a depth of 60 metres. "When using smaller diameter equipment, 100 mm holes have been drilled to more than 200 metres," said Mr Ellis. The underground drilling system is designed by Mission of America. [Text] [Johannesburg MINING WEEK in English 9 May 84 p 3]

ANALYSIS REPORTS NO PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURE IN LAST 10 YEARS

London AFRICA NOW in English No 38, Jun 84 pp 56-57

[Text]

In his April report of the first 100 days of his administration, General Buhari said that Nigeria would stop importing rice and other staple foods as soon as local production caught up with consumption. He gave no date for this. If Nigeria could achieve even a proportion of the advances promised in the rhetoric of the last 10 years, its agriculture would be in reasonable fettle. Operation Feed the Nation, the Green Revolution, special committees and allocations and endless public recognition of the state of agriculture by politicians have done remarkably little to overcome the problems on the ground.

Despite Nigeria's huge population land is not a problem as in Kenya: of 91.2m hectares of land 75% is cultivable although much of the cultivable land is remote from major centres of population, which does pose difficulties. Much of the land, however, has low productivity because soils are relatively infertile and need inputs of fertiliser, improved seed varieties or the use of pesticides and do not obtain these on the required scale. In the southern humid rain forests there are problems of erosion; in the north periodic droughts. Yet none of these difficulties is insuperable.

A statistical comparison with China is interesting. China has approximately four times as much arable land under cultivation as does Nigeria and yet it manages — although there are bad years and imports of American grain — to feed 1bn Chinese. Nigeria is finding increasing difficulty to feed 80m people. This disparity in performance reflects differences of approach and the lower priority which is accorded to agriculture. In China the sector comes at the top.

Agriculture used to be the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, providing most of its exports: in 1960 80%; in 1970 44%; but today a mere 5% although the sector still employs 60% of the workforce. Some reasons for this drastic decline are understandable. The most notable is the rise of oil which since the civil war has completely displaced agriculture as the principal export. Other reasons include periodic disasters such as drought but much of the problem is the result of neglect, wrong allocations of resources or low producer prices which in turn have exacerbated other trends such as the drift from the land.

The neglect may be explained by the euphoria induced by the oil-rich years; politically it has been inexcusable. Today farming is simply not a lucrative business. The problems go far deeper than such an analysis implies. There has been no significant growth in agricultural production since 1970 and even where efforts have been made to improve rural infrastructure they have rarely been commensurate with either the need or the reasonable claims such areas had upon the economy as a whole.

The collapse of export commodities has been paralleled by an increase of food imports. Nigeria does not even have the excuse of other African countries which have concentrated upon cash crops for export to the detriment of producing food for home consumption.

A great deal of money has been invested in sugar yet only the Bacita estate of Kwara produces on any scale. Palm oil has long since collapsed as a major export; cocoa

which formerly met 20% of world demand now only meets 12%. Whereas commodity exports used to be cocoa, groundnuts and groundnut oil, palm kernels, rubber, cotton and cotton seed, palm oil and timber, at present only cocoa has any significance as an export.

Imports have risen. Some of these changes represent improvements, greater wealth has led to higher home consumption while part of the import growth is the result of changing demand -- for rice and wheat -- that could not be met by local agriculture. But even when such developments have been taken into account they do not explain the 15-fold increase in food imports which occurred during the 1970s.

It is easy enough to list the problems -- the widening gap between the incomes of farmers and urban wages, the need for better conservation of water or of crops after harvest (a high proportion of harvests lost), the lack of extension workers -- yet in the end we come in a circle. As much as anything the answers lie in attitudes.

Those who can leave the land do so and no rhetoric keeps them there. Many people argue that agriculture ought to receive top priority in development but this rarely occurs. Thus the 1981-1985 plan allocated 13% of resources to the sector; it stated that output should increase by 6.5% a year to satisfy needs but then settled for a target of only 4% increase. Why?

The peasant farmer remains the key and what is done about him? He has to be persuaded to change into a cash crop farmer but he will only do this if the change represents a profit to himself. That aspect of agriculture is too often ignored. Most farmers get poor remuneration, they see their children drift to the towns, they face endless problems which are ill-understood even by the best-meaning advisers. Above all the drudgery of small farming has to be understood by those who preach a back-to-

the-land philosophy.

In the late 70s a study was carried out by Edeniye Osuntogun of Ife University. He found that only 39% of credits to farmers were actually spent on their farming. The balance went to cover social service needs -- education for their children, health, housing, durable goods. This use of the money accurately reflected the existing lack of rural amenities and it is that problem which must be tackled if any sense is to be made of back-to-the-land drives. The lesson is clear enough: agriculture will not be made a success by extension work improvements alone. To keep the young in the rural areas requires the provision of amenities on a par with those supplied to the urban areas.

The major project approach to agriculture is important and in Nigeria is especially represented by the river basin development authorities (RBDAs) -- there are eleven of these -- but too often they are top heavy developments with massive funds from World Bank or other sources. They produce developments for massive irrigation or resettlement schemes yet when is the peasant a part of the planning? He is told it is for his good and from long experience regards such developments with extreme caution.

Yet the possibilities are enormous. Self-sufficiency in food production is a reasonable short-term goal. It ought to be followed by Nigeria becoming a major exporter: of staple foods to its ECOWAS neighbours or the Sahel region, and then to Europe and farther afield with revitalised commodities or winter fruit and vegetables. The north has a climate comparable to California but its potential has hardly been touched.

The real key does not reside in RBDAs or the development of cash crops for export, important though these may be. It lies with better incentives to peasants. But the peasant must know that he keeps the fruits of his higher production •

ANALYSIS OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LAW COURT CONTROVERSY PROVIDED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 11, 23 May 84 p 8

[Article in the column "Pointers": "Trials and Tribulations"]

[Text]

NIGERIA: TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS. This week the High Court in Lagos ruled in favour of the three former *Unity Party of Nigeria* (UPN) governors' now before a military anti-corruption tribunal. The atmosphere in Lagos is fraught, not least because the UPN was the main opposition to the *National Party of Nigeria* (NPN) against which the coup was staged. And unlike a lot of their counterparts, UPN politicians did not flee the country after the coup.

The High Court, questioning whether the tribunal's jurisdiction covers the crimes with which the governors are charged, has granted their application for the right to seek a civilian court order barring their trial before the corruption tribunal. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) will probably amend the decrees to extend the jurisdiction of the military courts - for instance by backdating Decree No.3, under which the trial is taking place, to include the period of the alleged crimes (July 1983).

While this particular point is a technicality, the military government has so far been unwilling to press retroactive legislation. Such caution may have to be discarded. The Federal Government's Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers Decree 1984, rushed out in an extraordinary government gazette on 22 May, is intended to render null and void any suit pending before any court of law, challenging the competence of the military government to make any decree or edict. Whether this latest decree - known as No.13 - will have the desired effect remains to be seen. But it is a challenge to the High Court, giving the *Buhari* regime the sort of absolute power which none of its predecessors, military or otherwise, assumed.

The public and press are excluded from the tribunals, and only the judgement will be made public. The Nigerian Bar Association is boycotting the tribunals because they are being held in camera and because the military not only investigate the crimes with which the accused are charged, they also chair the tribunals and confirm sentence, without allowing any right to appeal. The minimum sentence under Decree No.3 is 21 years imprisonment, and the maximum is life imprisonment (although the SMC can change that to a term not exceeding 25 years.) The Bar Association's boycott was in evidence when the Lagos tribunal opened last week: no defence lawyer was present.

There is something to be said for special procedures to deal with corruption. Long drawn-out litigation through a series of courts does not necessarily lead to justice. And many prosecution witnesses would incriminate themselves by giving evidence. Certainly care has been taken to select experienced officers for tribunal duty. In Lagos, for instance, the chairman of the tribunal is Brig **Paul Ufuoma Omu**, a member of the SMC and commander

of the Staff College at Jaji. He served on a Commonwealth tribunal in Trinidad for six months in 1971. As governor of Cross River State in the last military administration, he has first-hand knowledge of manning state governments. Other members of the tribunal are Brig. Malami Nassarawa, adjutant-general and custodian of discipline; Naval Captain Godwin Ndubisi Kanu, chief of naval personnel; Lt. Col. Yinka Martins; and Justice T.A. Oyeyipo.

The charge against the UPN governors is political dynamite: they are accused of having accepted Naira 2.8m as a "kick-back" from the contractors, *Bouygues Nigeria Ltd*, on the eve of the 1983 elections, to "corruptly enrich one person, namely the *Unity Party of Nigeria*". (*Bouygues* was building the "Great Nigeria House" for the Great Nigeria Insurance Co. Ltd). The charge was first made by Brig. Tunde Idiagbon, Chief of Staff, when he alleged on 10 February that the three ex-governors had admitted it. Relatives of the accused say that the detained politicians had not even been questioned on the subject when Idiagbon gave his press conference. *Bouygues* say they have documents to show that the Naira 2.8m was paid to them in error and that they returned the money, which represented advance payment to all sub-contractors and the project managers. They deny Chief Awolowo's assertion that *Bouygues* gave the money as "a voluntary donation" to the UPN, in the form of a cheque for Naira 1.8m made out in favour of Anonymous GNS Ogun, Ondo and Oyo states", dated 5 July 1983, and a second payment - in cash - of Naira 1m on 18 July 1983.

The UPN typically funded itself in this way. Other political parties did the same. Indeed, Idiagbon on 7 March gave details of payments by the French-owned construction company, *Fougerole (Nigeria) Ltd* of Naira 24m to various NPN figures, naming the Nigerian (now in detention) who actually made the payments. There is a mountain of evidence against former members of the NPN government. But the SMC and its army lawyers chose to try the former UPN governors first, with all its implications for the Yoruba establishment and Awolowo - long the most hated opponent of northern Nigerian potentates ●

Footnote

1. Olabisi Onabanjo, Bola Ige and Michael Ajasin of Ogun, Oyo and Ondo respectively.

'GHOST' BAKERS BLAMED FOR KANO BREAD SCARCITY

Kano SUNDAY TRIUMPH in English 13 May 84 p 16

[Article by Murtala Abdullahi and Salisu Alhassan]

[Text]

MIDDLEMEN and the existence of 'ghost' bakers were among the major factors responsible for the recent scarcity of bread in the Kano State capital.

Another factor was the granting of flour allocation to private individuals by the flour mills who later sold them to the middlemen at exorbitant prices.

Investigation conducted by Sunday Triumph reporters revealed that the middlemen, backed by influential businessmen controlled the sales of almost all the flour and the by-products produced by the Nigeria Flour Mill.

The middlemen were also said to be colluding with some top officials of the company to compile the list of false bakers as

genuine bakers and divert the allocations to the market at exploitative prices of ₦50 instead of ₦19.40.

Making the allegations, the chairman of the Kano State Master Bakers Association, Alhaji Lawan Maiturare, who is the main signatory of the notice served to all bakery houses in the state to suspend bread baking recently, claimed that officials of the mills and some community leaders possessed over 50 allocation slips.

Contacted on the issue, the Sales Manager of the Northern Nigeria Flour Mill, Alhaji Bashir Bayero, debunked the allegations saying that they were false and calculated to tarnish the good image of the company.

Alhaji Bashir Bayero attributed the present scarcity of flour and its by-products to insufficient supply of wheat.

Efforts to contact officials of the state Ministry of Trade and Industry for comments proved abortive.

In another development the Kano State Military Governor, Air Commodore Hamza Abdullahi, has said that sales managers and distributors of essential commodities created difficulties in the distribution of goods in the country.

The governor, who was exchanging views with officials of UAC Nigeria Limited at the Government House, accused some sales managers and agents of some companies of colluding with middlemen to enrich themselves.

SUGAR COMPANY REPORTEDLY ON VERGE OF COLLAPSE

Kano SUNDAY TRIUMPH in English 13 May 84 p 16

[Article by Bako Mohammed]

[Text]

THE Savannah Sugar Company Limited in Numan, Gongola State, said to be one of the largest in Africa is on the verge of collapse.

Reports from Numan said management laxity, threat of bankruptcy and internal crisis have been forcing the company to a halt.

Sunday Triumph investigations revealed that the company's existence is threatened by non-payment of staff salaries, lack of spare parts which have already been hampering the 1983/84 production with an alleged shady deals in the purchases of the company's technical appliances.

It was reliably learnt that the company's staff numbering about 3,000, have not been paid their salaries since January this year.

Instead, during the last Easter break, the staff were categorized into four and each paid ₦40, ₦50, ₦60 and ₦150 respectively to "manage through the Easter celebration", my source said.

My inquiries showed that the non-payment of staff salaries was caused by the non-remittance of federal government quarterly subvention to the company since December last year.

Further investigation revealed that the company, into which some ₦301,350,000 was invested since its inception, has not been able to produce enough to pay its workers' salary without seeking federal government financial aid.

The source disclosed that the company's staff annual salary was about ₦8 million while its annual production since 1979, when it started full operation, fluctuated between ₦6 million and ₦4 million per production year, adding that the 1982/83 production, highest output so far, yielded about ₦6 million.

General maintenance apart, the company needs an additional ₦2 million to ₦3 million annually to pay workers' salary. However, the giant sugar company, with 65,000 hectares of land on which all the sugarcane needed for production are planted, did not produce any refined sugar in its 83/84 production year due to lack of spare parts.

Reasons why the spare parts, ordered two years ago, did not arrive were put at the prevailing economic situation in the country and the bottleneck in import licence issuance though some allegations have it that most of the company's machinery were bought second hand.

Further investigation revealed that the lathe machine which is responsible for machining the factory's mill rollers was bought second hand while the company's two "Black Stone" electricity generators with each having an output capacity of 1.7 megawatts were also bought second hand.

However, majority of the junior and intermediate staff interviewed blamed the discredited Shagari administration for its total negligence of the upkeep of the company.

The investigation finally revealed that land development in the company which is an essential factor in sugarcane cultivation could

not be pursued due to financial constraints, bringing about a situation of under-utilization of the factory capacity which now has only 3,000 hectares of land cultivated as against the 65,000 hectares required to feed the present capacity of the factory.

Meanwhile, the company produces only 11,000 metric tonnes of refined sugar per annum instead of its capacity of 150,000 metric tonnes.

The federal government announced in the budget that it would concentrate its efforts on those areas of industrial development that are of highest priority like the Savannah Sugar Company, Numan, in Gongola State.

HIGH PRICE OF MEAT BLAMED FOR SHORTFALL IN ANIMAL POPULATION

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 28 Apr 84 p 12

[Article by Mariam Aleshinloye]

[Text]

THE current high price of meat has been blamed on depletion of domestic animal population by rinderpest.

General Manager of the Nigerian Livestock Production Company, (NLPC) Professor Shehu Bida, said last year there were only 161,000 tonnes of meat as against the projected 212,262 tonnes. The demand for meat last year was 255,176 tonnes.

The general manager said if nothing was done to increase livestock production, supply of meat this year was likely to fall to 151,000 tonnes as against demand of 277,235 tonnes.

He said the immediate step that could be taken to prevent further loss of livestock was to import more rinderpest vaccines.

He said government should ensure frequent vaccination of

calves every two to three years, adding that rinderpest recurred because cattle were not being given vaccinations frequently.

Professor Bida said campaigns by the Federal Government alone was not effective and suggested that anti-rinderpest committees be set up in all states to work out strategies for its control and eradication.

Professor Bida said for the total eradication of the disease, the co-operation of all ECOWAS member countries would be required.

He said an effective diagnostic testing throughout ECOWAS countries would be required and animals suspected to be infected by the disease should be slaughtered immediately.

CSO: 3400/1059

CLAMPDOWN ON BUNKERERS LEADS TO FUEL BUILDUP

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 12 May 84 p 1

[Text]

CLAMPDOWN by the Federal Military Government on the smuggling of petroleum products has led to a build-up of fuel at Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) depots.

A New Nigerian investigation shows that because of the clampdown on illegal bunkering, Kaduna and Warri refineries have built up stocks of petroleum products.

At the Kaduna Refinery, the General Manager, Alhaji Sani Bello confirmed that bridge-lifting of fuel from the South had been suspended.

He said this was because the refinery had enough petroleum products to supply the North. He attributed the ability of the refinery to meet the demand for fuel in the North to drastic curtailment of smuggling activities.

The general manager gave the breakdown of the petroleum products available at the refinery as follows: Liquified Petroleum Gas, (LPG) 940 cubic metres; PMG (gasoline), 65,950 cubic metres; Dual Purpose Kerosine, (DPK) 27,850 cubic metres; Automotive Gas Oil, (AGO) 26,410 cubic metres and Low Pour Fuel Oil, (LPFO), 12,870 cubic metres.

Mr. Chike Ezimora, Public Affairs Manager of the NNPC also confirmed that the Warri Refinery has shut down its Low Pour Fuel Oil (LPFO) section for lack of space to store its petroleum products.

Mr. Ezimora told the New Nigerian that the situation arose as a result of build-up of fuel oil following the clampdown on illegal bunkerers.

CSO: 3400/1059

BRIEFS

DAM PROJECT THREATENED--Minna--Two dams valued at N20 million being constructed for the Niger state government in Kagara and Suleja have run into hitches because proper geological studies were not conducted. The construction companies have discovered soft sandy earth at the center of the dam where the strength of the foundation is most vital. This has made it impossible for work to continue. The site engineer for the construction company at the Suleja dam told newsmen that the error would cost about N1.5 million to rectify. The visiting newsmen were also told that contracts for the dams were awarded well before detailed designs for construction were produced. Mallam Hammamad Sariki, Resident Engineer for Niger State Water Board could not explain how his department arrived at the initial N12 million they agreed to pay for the dams without a design of what they wanted. [Austin Iyashere] [Text] [Kaduna THE DEMOCRAT WEEKLY in English 13 May 84 p 1]

CSO: 3400/1059

SOUTH AFRICA

UTILITY OF SANCTIONS BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DISCUSSED

Sanctions as International Pressure

Bonn INFORMATIONSDIENST SUDLICHES AFRIKA in German Mar 84 p 2

[Editorial by Heinz Moellers]

[Text] Undoubtedly, South Africa greatly depends on foreign economic relations, on investments and technical know-how from abroad and, despite its own great efforts, continues to depend on modern weapons systems and on oil, to keep its armed forces still strong after the current cease-fire for assignments in the region and increasingly also in its own country; it depends on the markets, mainly, of the western world for its ore and mineral wealth and its farm products. Future issues of INFORMATIONSDIENST are going to report on South Africa's international relations in the various economic sectors.

Sanctions against South Africa are an effective means of pressure by the international community seeking to effect peaceful change in the apartheid state. This issue will deal with the political aspects of sanctions.

Exclusively political reasons have thus far prevented such sanctions. As early as in 1946, the apartheid policy reached the agenda of the UN General Assembly. In 1952, a group of 13 countries urged dealing with South Africa's policy as threatening peace and violating human rights. After the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, UN Resolution 134 of 1 April 1960 asserted that the apartheid regime "might jeopardize world peace and international security."

In 1962, the General Assembly first asked all member states for extensive boycott measures. One year later, the Security Council, backed by a U.S. vote, recommended a voluntary weapons embargo. That was during the decolonization Black Africa. In 1977, the voluntary embargo was turned into a mandatory one. The bloody insurrection of Soweto in June 1976 had forced the Council to take action again after a long time. Through passing Resolution 418 on 4 November 1977, which demanded the weapons embargo, the western powers for the first time showed themselves ready to proceed against South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That chapter sets down the measures the UN might take against "the threat against peace and acts of aggression." Western representatives prevented mandatory economic sanctions in the Security Council, which holds the authority over them, and the "international year for starting sanctions against South Africa," under UN sponsorship in 1982, remained unsuccessful and caused no response.

Every FRG government was of the opinion its manifold relations with South Africa--not last its economic ones--could be used for a peaceful dismantling of apartheid. Those relations have been in existence for decades. They had no influence on peaceful change. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that German and international capital has backed the apartheid regime through massive capital and propaganda expenditures whenever it was pushed into a crisis (cf. Geisler and Wellmer, "DM Investments in South Africa," INFORMATIONSDIENST SUDLICHES AFRIKA, WR 10, Bonn, 1983).

The FRG government has invited Botha to visit Bonn on 5 and 6 June. That is going to be Botha's first European trip. The Federal Chancellor regards the treaties with South Africa as a first step toward permanent peace in that region. The causes for the conflict have no bearing on these treaties, however. Rather than in the inter-state area, the problem lies in the country itself. A constitution is going into effect there that leaves the majority of the population disfranchised; there, 3.5 million people have meanwhile been disfranchised through the homeland policy and the passport laws and pushed into the misery of the reservations, another 1.8 million have to expect their resettlement any day; there, for the blacks, while being granted fewer rights, is only room enough to the extent they are needed in the industry, agriculture and the administration. The conflict continues. The international community is keeping its liability. The demand for sanctions remains on the agenda.

Relevance of Sanctions Examined

Bonn INFORMATIONSDIENST SUDLICHES AFRIKA in German Mar 84 pp 8-9

[Article by Rainer Falk]

[Text] ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of Windhoek, highly gratified, commented on the concluding of the Nkomati accord between Mozambique and South Africa and the accord on the retreat of South African occupation troops from southern Angola as follows: "That the two biggest intriguers among the so-called frontal states take that kind of a step almost makes South Africa presentable. Under these conditions the trade which the Republic has already been secretly engaged in with some Black African states can now be made public and extended; even establishing diplomatic relations seems conceivable."¹

Does that mean the time has come to drop the demand of forcing the apartheid regime to its knees by imposing comprehensive and binding economic sanctions? Those in power are openly speculating that way. According to Pretoria's deputy foreign minister, Louis Nel, the new climate in the region precluded "attempts at changing the stable order in South Africa, be it by economic sanctions, investment boycotts or revolution."² Even though the representatives of the apartheid state, who would suffer most from sanctions, have always opposed that demand, of course, in the light of most recent developments in Southern Africa³ a number of questions yet must be raised and settled that have to do with the legitimacy and feasibility of sanctions.

The International Law Aspect

Thus far, imposing comprehensive and binding sanctions against South Africa had been urged with reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("endangering peace and international security"). The international community's outlawing the apartheid state responded to a triple violation of international law: according to the international convention on prosecuting and punishing the crime of apartheid, apartheid rates as a "crime against humanity"; because of its own aggressiveness to the outside and within, the apartheid system furthermore constitutes a "serious impediment to international cooperation and peace"; finally, the continuing occupation of Namibia is an open violation of international law since the UN General Assembly in 1966, as the legal successor of the League of Nations, announced the termination of the South African mandate.

None of the three reasons, which would make the imposing of sanctions against South Africa not only possible but actually compelling, has lost its force through the recently concluded treaties of South Africa with Angola and Mozambique.

In principle, there applies what the UN special commission against apartheid formulated in taking a position on the most recent diplomatic developments in South Africa as follows: "As long as apartheid continues in South Africa, the international community is under the obligation to impose comprehensive and binding sanctions against the racist regime in South Africa and support the legitimate struggle of the despoiled and suppressed peoples in South Africa and Namibia for their self-determination, independence and freedom."⁴

On the "Feasibility" of Sanctions: The Special Role of the Frontal States

The diplomatic arrangement between South Africa and Mozambique largely is the result of the political and military pressure and the economic destabilization Pretoria has been practicing against its neighbors in recent years. It can be understood only against the background of the straits into which the FRELIMO government was plunged by that policy and must therefore be regarded as instable in principle. Moreover, the political destabilization and South Africa's economic warfare against Mozambique provide striking evidence for the feasibility and effectiveness of resolutely implemented sanction measures.⁵ The South African rulers, in contrast to official arguments in the West, have always been rating the effectiveness of sanctions as very high.

This boycott strategy, as pursued by South Africa, on the one hand points out the vulnerability of the frontal states' economies, marked by colonial deformation and interlinkage. Comprehensive and binding sanctions against South Africa therefore could also only fully be joint by them if the international community were to be willing to share the costs through special assistance, as was demanded by the international conference on sanctions against South Africa in May 1981, among others.

On the other hand, however, the fact that the South African confrontation strategy already causes the frontal states enormous costs that far exceed their economic capacity means that the alternatives actually come down to either continuing this condition permanently (with catastrophic effects on the frontal states) or

having the international community assume the costs undoubtedly connected with international sanctions. While the former would leave the causes for the unrest in Southern Africa permanently untouched, the latter would offer a realistic chance to terminate that condition (already so costly and impeding the frontal states in their development) at an acceptable pace.

The reservation, offered at times that imposing comprehensive sanctions against South Africa would provoke unpredictable countermeasures by the racist regime from which the frontal states themselves would suffer the most⁶, misses therefore the actual problem and decision situation.

South African counteractions against the countries in the region, as already seen in the past before sanctions were imposed, could be fully precluded only if the legitimacy of the apartheid regime were fully recognized and its domestic and foreign policy be fully accepted. This, however, is least likely, especially from the standpoint of the oppressed majority.

Furthermore, as to the adjustment problems in the industrial states of the West to be expected from the imposing of economic sanctions, while they do exist, they could yet easily be coped with when the political will is there through appropriate preplanning.⁷ This also takes care of the objection that in a "pluralistic democracy no consensus in internal policy can be achieved for projects fairly high in costs and burdened by numerous uncertainties."⁸ First one must point out that sanction measures practiced by the West thus far (e.g. the boycott against Chile--under Allende--or Nicaragua, the economic sanctions against Argentina during the Falklands War, the Olympic boycott against the Soviet Union, or the Reagan administration's selective economic embargo against the Soviet Union, and so forth) by no means depended on any domestic policy consensus but were highly controversial. Yet they were still carried out because they conformed to the current interests of the ruling circles in the West. In the case of South Africa, the interest situation is likely to be different. A realistic appraisal of it therefore is one of the most important prerequisites for a strategy on enforcing international sanctions against the apartheid regime.

A Spur to the Western Strategy of "Peaceful Change"

Maybe South Africa's current policy is over the long haul detrimental to western interests. Appealing to a long-range enlightened self-interest of the West as the chief instrument of its policy, however, means banking on a degree of rationality that is simply alien to imperialist policy interests in Southern Africa (and elsewhere). It has often been shown and need not be reiterated at this point that the strategy thus far pursued by the West, of "peaceful change" or "critical dialogue" or "constructive commitment," has not been able to change the apartheid system and its policy (e.g. the EC Code).⁹ Comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa are diametrically opposed to strategic and profit interests of the West in Southern Africa. Even partial boycotts like the weapons embargo imposed in 1977 would be possible only if enough international pressure is brought to bear on the West.

A policy of comprehensive sanctions hence is not at all anticipated in the concepts of "peaceful change" that prevail in the West. It would even contradict the very nature of these concepts because they regard the apartheid regime itself as the crucial agent of such "change," as only proven once again by a recently published position paper by the FRG government. It says: "Peaceful change in South Africa, however, cannot bypass the government. How fast the change can go in South Africa depends primarily on developments in the country itself and on the courage and vision of its government."¹⁰ That the FRG government holds no store for economic sanctions is no surprise: "It rather trusts in the effect of steady critical dialogue."¹¹

And even a policy of selective economic sanctions, as proposed by Kuehne, for instance, does not break out of the scope of such a position envisaging a dialogue with the racists, even if those proposed measures no doubt far transcend the line of the South Africa policy up to now and regard the dialogue policy merely as supplementing the pressure under which the Pretoria regime should be placed.¹² There also are evidently ulterior motives in proposing supplementing the dialogue with the apartheid regime by a dialogue with the liberation movements; what ultimately mattered was "to prevent through intensified dialogue and cooperation the otherwise unavoidable dependency of the liberation movements on the Soviet Union."

It means operating with washed out concepts when the decision makers in the western countries are asked to reduce economic relations with South Africa to "what is absolutely necessary in terms of interests" (Kuehne). This evidently means being blind to the fact that the policy dictated by imperialist policy has its own reason that aims at enforcing in imperialist interests all that is possible under any given conditions. Under that aspect one must understand that the ruling "peaceful change" strategy primarily aims at anticipating the call for comprehensive and binding economic sanctions or foil their implementation. Against all opposing facts, the western concept of "peaceful change" starts from the premise that trade, investments, economic relations with South Africa, in short, are "motors of progress." The variant of "peaceful change" engaged in by the Reagan administration under the slogan of "constructive engagement" in Southern Africa furthermore includes South Africa in the U.S. regional and global strategy, an explicit recognition of South Africa's strategic importance, and an intensification of the economic engagement (through more trade and capital export) in that region. In the forefront of the considerations of the Reagan administration is that South Africa, the strongest military power in the region, is a useful instrument to counter "international communism." That not only meant taking over the rationale by which the apartheid regime has for years been courting western assistance. The new doctrine also means that henceforth any weakening of South Africa should have to be prevented as it violates "vital western interests." The U.S. 1981 veto in the Security Council against condemning South Africa for the "Protea Operation" against Angola and the refusal to agree to sanctions are thus anything but an expression of consternation. They are deliberately used means within the scope of a policy that keeps intensifying the aggressiveness of the apartheid regime.

For the oppressed majority in South Africa and the resolute enemies of apartheid that can lead to one conclusion only: There is no cause for stopping the campaign for imposing comprehensive and binding sanctions on South Africa. The opposite, rather, is true: Sanctions--all the more at this time.

FOOTNOTES

1. ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Windhoek, 16 March 1984.
2. Quoted from INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 22 February 1984.
3. For the development in Southern Africa since the start of this year see also my overall estimate in AIB, DIE DRITTE WELT ZEITSCHRIFT, No 5, 1984.
4. Oliver Tambo at a press conference, in "Clarion Call to All Opponents of Apartheid," supplement to ANC WEEKLY NEWS BRIEFING, London, 18 March 1984, pp 2 f.
5. Cf. K. Semin-Panzer, "War and Hunger," INFORMATIONSDIENST SUDLICHES AFRIKA, No 2, 1984.
6. Cf., e.g., W. Kuehne, "UN Sanctions and Hope for 'Peaceful Change,' Options for Western States Vis-s-vis South Africa," VEREINTE NATIONEN, Bonn, No 4, 1983, pp 110 f.
7. Cf., e.g., C. Elliot, "The International Impact and Adjustment to Economic Sanctions on South Africa," Geneva, 1980.
8. Kuehne, op. cit., p 11.
9. Compare also the standard refutation of the objections raised against the demand for sanctions: H. Mayer and P. Wahl, "Sanktionen gegen Suedafrika--Tatsachen und Argumente," Frankfurt, n.d.; and G. Wellmer, "Weak Arguments--On the Debate over General Economic Sanctions Against South Africa," INFORMATIONSDIENST SUDLICHES AFRIKA, Nos 5/6, June 1981.
10. Deutscher Bundestag, 10th Legislative Period, Issuance 10/833 (FRG Policy in Southern Africa), Bonn, 21 December 1983, p 4.
11. Ibid.
12. Kuehne, op. cit., p 113, writes for instance: "Completely isolating South Africa diplomatically, as periodically urged by the UN General Assembly, would impede such a dialogue meant to supplement the exercise of pressure."

5885

CSO: 3420/29

SACP SECRETARY GENERAL INTERVIEWED

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English Apr 84 pp 102-106

[Interview with Moses Mabhida, general secretary of the South African Communist Party, in the Soviet Union during a recent visit; no specific date given]

[Text]

Last November, a referendum was held among South Africa's white population, and constitutional changes were passed by a majority vote. What were the aims pursued by the racist authorities when they conceived and carried out the so-called constitutional reform?

To give a fuller answer to this question I would like to retrospect briefly and call to mind another act—the Act of Union which was passed by the British Parliament in 1909 and brought the Union of South Africa into being.

The Act of Union was a great fraud; it was a trick that was played on the dispossessed natives who had long been subjected to plunder and violence. The Act of Union meant the ceding of this people's freedom and independence to a group of colonialists who had no right of land ownership of other people. They were and are thieves who have divided stolen loot.

The history of the Act is well known to many people in the world—the Act was meant to deprive South Africa's indigenous population of 87 per cent of the best lands to be worked as farmlands, of gold and diamonds which had been found a few decades before, and of many other mineral resources which were to be found.

By violating the basic human rights and dignity of the Africans, the colonialists doomed them to poverty, to steady impoverishment, to death from hunger and disease. This was the result of a consistent policy of exploitation and oppression of the African people who had already been living in inhuman conditions. In passing the Act of Union and ceding political power to the white minority the British imperialists were guided primarily by the interests of the British Empire.

Besides, the Act of Union was an expression of fear of the white minority which was experiencing severe strains because of the struggle of the people against ruthless methods of exploitation and oppression. This struggle later developed into the national liberation struggle.

It was this struggle of our people that brought about alliances of different kinds—alliances of different racial groups and alliances of varied political shades that kept the enemy on his toes all the time. To suppress this bitter struggle the enemy resorted to methods of repression: first, in the 1950s, the Communist Party was banned, then, in the 1960s, the African National Congress (ANC) and most of the trade unions were prohibited; then the leadership of these organizations was incarcerated. At that time the racists felt that they were riding on the crest of the wave and that nothing would disturb them. It was precisely this feeling that made the Boer autocracy think that it had succeeded in its victory.

The beginning of the 1970s was marked by a new rise in the liberation movement. First, there was student unrest at African universities, and when the working class entered the arena the whole situation and character of the struggle changed radically. The workers demanded not only higher wages and better working conditions, they focused on problems of racial discrimination and demanded to lift the ban on trade unions.

It was the rise of the strike movement that freed the Africans from their fear of the regime. The workers' movement forced the racists to recognize African trade unions, which had been rejected and ignored by the employers and their organizations, and by the successive white minority regimes that ruled the country.

The wave of strikes continues to create tensions throughout the country. Strikes have awakened our people; political activity is growing all over the country; people from all walks of life have supported actions of boycotting transport services which have raised fares; they have rejected rent hikes; the students are continuously fighting for better education; and African women, who are groaning under the double yoke of exploitation are up in arms against the atrocities perpetrated by the regime against their children.

In order to preserve the racist rule and thwart the growing resistance of the people, the regime is using violent methods: the use of the gun has always been the simplest thing, the use of baton is no problem for the regime's police; dogs are set on demonstrators and strikers. The present situation is characterized by increased terror; death sentences are frequently meted out for "political" offences. All this is meant as a deterrent to all those who dare to oppose the regime's oppressive measures. Among all the people in South Africa, however, there are symptoms that the spirit of defiance and upsurge is growing.

This upsurge in the country is affecting political life in the white community: there has been unrest within its ruling National Party—it is split; the Dutch Reformed Church, which has always been one of the strongest bastions of apartheid, is disjoined; the monolithic mainstay of Africanerdom, the Broederbond is being shaken to its foundation.

The September 1983 statement of our Party's Central Committee reads: "South Africa is in the grip of the longest recession in its history. Apart from a short period in 1980, the downward slide has persisted since 1975. Even the most optimistic among the establishment economists are unable to forecast an early reversal of the current trends."

South Africa is fully integrated into the capitalist world's economic system, therefore, when the capitalist world is in the throes of economic problems, South Africa also is affected. But in South Africa's present situation the troubles are inextricably linked with its internal situation arising out of political unrest. South Africa's ruling class is facing the mounting challenge from the national and working-class movement and the restless landless peasantry; these forces are demanding no less than the dismantling of the whole of the racist edifice.

Added to white South Africa's problems is the increasing intensity of the armed actions of the Liberation Army Umkhonto we Sizwe [the ANC military branch.—Ed.]; this aspect is beginning to erode the confidence of powerful sections of international capital of the white ruling class' ability to retain power. The influential business organization Business Environment Risk Information in its recent survey advised businessmen to avoid long-term investments in South Africa. This organization is of the opinion that South Africa is falling within the category of "prohibitive".

Although the Western imperialist states have thrown a protective mantle around South Africa and refuse to implement the UN-declared mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa, the mounting revolutionary challenge is dictating its own solution to the problem. It is this challenging situation, resulting from the working-class struggles, the struggle of stu-

dents, and the armed actions by the national liberation movement that is isolating the racist regime within the borders of South Africa itself.

It is for this reason that white South Africans who have always disdained the African people, have been compelled to recognize the African trade unions. The regime is attempting to create an African middle class: the racist regime is looking for collaborators.

Therefore, the recent whites-only referendum means that the Boer autocracy is guided by the same spirit of plunder which prompted the British government to pass the Act of Union in 1909. It was a result of the fear of unity of the African people, which was then gathering momentum. Presently, the white-minority regime fears the unity of all the oppressed peoples of South Africa under the leadership of the African National Congress. Together with their imperialist allies, the rulers of the country see the ANC/SACP alliance as the greatest threat to their survival. The white autocracy, therefore, wants to incorporate the Indian and Coloured communities in its repressions against the African people.

Progressive mankind is challenging racism everywhere, and racist South Africa is attempting to bluff the world. The white-minority regime wants to say in future that they—the whites, Indians, and Coloureds—form the majority in what they call the "white portion" of South Africa. When it comes to the demands of the oppressed peoples of South Africa, even the Liberals, are ready to man the "white fortress" and defend white supremacy, whatever name it assumed.

What is, in your opinion, the alignment of class and political forces at the present stage of the liberation struggle in southern Africa?

The alignment of class and political forces inside South Africa is as follows: the big-business community is represented by the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and the New Republican Party (NRP); they express the interests of the English big capital. Then, the ruling National Party, which represents the Boer farmers and Afrikaner capitalists. The white workers are led by the Trade Union Council of South Africa and have taken a stand against the liberation movement defending the white-minority regime.

The racist regime has recruited the Bantustan puppets to fight against the liberation movement. The classical examples are Lennox Sebe of the Ciskei and Mphahlele of Venda. Both these puppets are perpetrating terror in the territories they occupy.

Besides, the racist regime enjoys the support of the imperialist states, the USA above all, which are the beneficiaries of the superprofits that accrue from apartheid.

On the other hand, there is the liberation movement led by the ANC and its ally, the South African Communist Party; the main force in this alliance is the working class which has been waging a bitter struggle against the white autocracy. The liberation movement enjoys the support of the progressive forces in the world and the socialist countries in particular led by the Soviet Union, and of the working class in the capitalist countries.

What do you think is the cause of the growing aggressiveness of the racist regime?

For a very long time Africa had only known two independent countries—Ethiopia and Liberia; that was the case until the end of the Second World War. A radical change came in the 1950s. The process of freedom and independence continued rapidly through the 1960s; it was then that a large number of African states gained their independence.

At that time, South Africa thought that this avalanche would never reach its borders. In fact it was even demanding the incorporation of the countries

which were then known as protectorates—Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. South Africa was assured by the fact that the then Portuguese colonies offered a protective cover of sorts from any attack. The South African racists thought that Rhodesia could cope with its situation; and they participated in fighting the liberation movement there.

In the early 1970s, Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, prepared a document known as Memorandum 39, which assured the Western world that independence had come to a stop on the Zambezi River, and that the Portuguese colonies would never be free from Portugal.

And when in the middle of the 1970s, this protective barrier collapsed, South Africa began to shake and imagine Umkhonto we Sizwe revolutionaries knocking at their door.

The 1980s have dealt yet another shattering blow to South Africa, when Rhodesia collapsed and in its stead appeared Zimbabwe. All the barriers had crumbled, and South Africa began to construct its own economic hopes of a "constellation" of states, trying to woo the southern African independent countries into the vortex of the South African economic web. The front-line states did not fall for the trick. Instead, they formed SADCC, which would free African countries from the clutches of racist South Africa. The front-line countries fully support the liberation movement in Namibia, led by SWAPO, and the struggle of the people of South Africa, led by the ANC. The campaign to isolate the regime internationally has been intensified.

The regime is gripped by fear. All the dreams of South Africa being a white man's land are collapsing; in order to reassure its supporters abroad and inside the country, the government has launched a campaign of intimidation against the independent African countries.

Therefore, the intensification of the struggle inside and outside South Africa is sowing fears in the camp of oppressors. What might have sounded like distant rumblings in the north is becoming the threatening thunders in the backyard.

It is well known that South Africa has intensified its contacts with the USA. How does this alliance between Washington and Pretoria affect the situation in the region?

There are many areas in which the US Administration has common policies with South Africa. The latter, for example, has constitutionally legitimized racist policy, the United States practices racial discrimination; the racist regime of South Africa pursues rabid anticommunist policy on the same level as Hitler did, and the present US Administration has formulated as the main creed of its policy the elimination of socialism as a socio-political system. Besides the US Administration considers South Africa to be in the sphere of its influence.

In 1982, William Casey, CIA Director, visited South Africa. Later it transpired that plans were afoot on how to expel the ANC from the front-line states. Indeed, it was after his visit that there was a spate of assassinations of the ANC and trade union officials. There are grounds to believe that this alliance between the USA and South Africa paved the way to the massacres in Maseru (the capital of Lesotho) in 1982.

The situation in southern Africa is tense. Washington supports South Africa in the latter's occupation of Namibia. It is with America's blessing that South Africa continues its aggression against Angola in the south of the country enabling Savimbi to be still active in Angola.

South Africa is presently receiving military equipment to strengthen the regime of apartheid. In Latin America and in other regions, the United States is propping up all fascist regimes like the South African racist regime.

How do you assess the socialist countries' assistance to the struggle against apartheid and racism?

When people involved in a struggle feel estranged and isolated, their spirit to fight wanes. Our people in South Africa had for a long time waged their struggle alone: they were victims of colonialists and were subjected to worst humiliations and suffering.

In this dark situation that prevails in South Africa it is a great relief when one feels a helping hand. The assistance to the struggle of the people of South Africa by the USSR and other socialist countries instills hope and beliefs in our victory.

This contribution comes in many forms, and the racist regime particularly fears this assistance, for the socialist countries have been persistently combatting all forms of the capitalist exploitation of man by man.

What are the objectives and tasks of the SACP at the present stage?

A mass struggle has erupted in South Africa; it involves all categories of our people. The workers are engaged in a protracted battle of strikes. The strikes are not just economic, but involve political questions. The workers being either commuters or migrant workers come face to face with constant violations of civil liberties and come up against economic ailments which the regime would like to place on the shoulders of the working people.

In these circumstances the Party has the task of guiding the workers politically—it must be with the masses. There are many young people who joined the struggle and who may not always understand the objectives. The Party must be in a position to point the right way. The mounting trade union movement is making its appearance after a long absence and the Party must help mobilize the trade unions into one powerful federation capable of dealing with both the employers and the regime.

In its programme the Party proclaims that one of its primary tasks is the liberation of the African people who suffer from the double yoke of being exploited as workers and oppressed as a nation. This task is being carried out by the national liberation movement of which our Party is a component part.

Our Party is part and parcel of the international working-class movement. Presently, this movement is engaged in a bitter struggle to save humanity peace. Our Party cannot postpone its participation in this noble task.

COPYRIGHT: Obshchestvo "Znaniye", 1984

English Translation Copyright: Progress Publishers 1984

CSO: 3400/1046

WALVIS BAY FACES 'DEVASTATING NEGATIVE GROWTH'

Walvis Bay NAMIB TIMES in English 25 May 84 pp 1-2

[Text]

"If this enclave is to remain a viable entity to the Republic of South Africa then serious thought will have to be given to the establishment of an authoritative Walvis Bay Committee of qualified and practical people to advise the authorities of the position and alleviate the situation," the chairman of the management committee of the Walvis Bay Town Council, Cr. Nico Retief said last night when he introduced the Municipality's 1984/5 budget.

Cr. Retief went on to say that the management committee had been faced with factors over the past few years that did not enhance the presentation of a progressive budget in a developing area . . . "and this despite numerous efforts by the South African authorities to stimulate development by way of industrial concessions.

"We have been faced since the collapse of our mainstay industry with a devastating negative growth in the years 1975 to 1983 when the rest of South Africa still enjoyed economic growth of five percent and more every year.

"Now that the growth in the Republic has dropped to virtually below zero you can be assured that the tendency will have a compounded side effect on this area

"I am not saying that Walvis Bay is doomed but as a responsible person who is fully acquainted with business and public life administration I would be purposely misleading you if I said there was nothing to worry about."

Cr. Retief went on to point out eight glaring anomalies:

- Continuous negative growth.
- Little development of necessities such as tarred streets — not a luxury but an imperative prerequisite for reduction in the cost-of-living for the public.
- Deteriorating income for the local authority.
- Progressively increasing cost of maintenance of the existing infrastructure.
- An excellent fishing season financially, but otherwise a relatively low quota.
- Relatively low ratio of work opportunity in the fishing with a worrying unemployment figure in South West Africa
- Pirating of fish stocks right under our eyes.
- If these foreign fishing vessels were obliged to replenish food and stores in Walvis Bay as well as pay transfer duties within the protected area of the Bay it could result in an income of millions of rand a year

Cr. Retief went on to say that despite all the fragmented committees that were currently operating the answer to the enclave's problems had not been found.

"To this end the management committee is looking at the introduction of a properly written business plan for all sections of our community", Cr. Retief said. "We will be following expenditure meticulously and will guard against bad investments.

"We are well aware of the development of an in-balance between top officials and workers in a time of stagnation and small turnover of staff.

"On the otherhand we are committed to see that the administration is in the hands of top class people.

FISHING CONCESSIONS

"The management committee is further committed in a committee with other members of Council to compile a list of recommendations on the question of new fishing concessions to be issued in 1985

"No local authority hosting such a lucrative industry can be expected not to effectively play a role in the final conditions under which concessions are granted.

"The Prime Minister, whom we know has an active interest in the well-being of the people of Walvis Bay, will shortly be apprised of the views of this our third-tier Government."

IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS

Cr. Retief went on to say that the management committee was also committed to Council to improve the living

conditions of all the inhabitants of Walvis Bay.

"In this respect we confirm our satisfaction with Council's approval of improvements at the Esplanade. I am also glad to note that some people have come forward in our local newspaper in support of our actions.

"With due regard to the effect thereof on reserves the management committee is committed to look at other projects that will have to be financed from income on reserves. We owe this to the inhabitants of our town at this juncture.

"In conclusion I wish to give the assurance that the management committee feels fully committed to the job they have been appointed for and can in the interest of the majority of public not deviate from the work they believe in," Cr. Retief said.

MINES MINISTER SAYS GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO SUSTAIN MINES

Harare THE HERALD in English 23 May 84 p 17

[Text] The Government has spent more than \$18 million to sustain the mining industry which has been seriously affected by the recession, the Minister of Mines, Dr Callistus Ndlovu, said yesterday.

Addressing the annual meeting of the Chamber of Mines in Harare, he said it was Government policy to try to avert the closure of any significant mines, particularly where there was hope of keeping them in operation pending a return to profitability.

The 45 percent increase in electricity charges in July last year had affected the mining industry severely and in some cases after long preparations, the Government offered soft loans to mines and industries to ease the burden.

"Essentially these loans merely enabled the borrowers to exchange one credit for another so that money was owed to the Government instead of the Electricity Supply Commission."

Cde Ndlovu said the loans were being offered on fairly easy terms of repayment and hoped that they would go a long way towards sustaining the industry.

He called for greater care and caution among all those working in the mining industry, as some of the equipment was almost obsolete.

Apart from rising input costs which were affecting the whole mining industry, Zimbabwean base mineral producers were facing severe competition from other international producers.

Cde Ndlovu said it was also Government policy to use all the country's minerals locally and it would be more sensible and subsequently more profitable to use them in manufacturing processes and export the products.

He said Zimbabwe's mineral production last year was valued at a record \$469 million, a 22,47 percent increase on the 1982 figure despite a drop in the volume index.

The figure reflected the influence of the devaluation of the dollar at the end of 1982.

Cde Ndlovu said the \$194 million worth of gold produced last year accounted for over 41 percent of all production value and was the highest in 15 years. It exceeded the total value of all mineral production in 1973.

"The results emphasise that whatever slings and arrows of outrageous fortune afflict us here in Zimbabwe, gold continues to be of paramount importance as an earner of foreign exchange."

He said the reopening of the Golden Kopje mine in Chinhoyi was encouraging and there were other major mining groups contemplating further expansion of their existing gold mines.

Cde Ndlovu said the roasting plant in Kwekwe continued to provide necessary treatment facilities for the recovery of gold from difficult ores, and concentrates supplied had increased by about 20 percent over the last six months.

Because of the increased supply of concentrates, there was now a lot of untreated stock and plans were underway to expand.

He called on all mines to intensify their in-service training programmes to improve technical skills among the workers and his ministry would soon hold discussions with the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare on money being made available to mines and companies undertaking such training programmes.

Cde Ndlovu said investigations had revealed that the primary causes for the loss of 35 lives in mine accidents last year were carelessness and lack of adequate supervision.

He said greater efforts were necessary for the prevention of accidents in mines and this year's safety slogan was: "Be careless, be dead."

CSO: 3400/1071

DROUGHT RELIEF NOT ENOUGH FOR CHIBI NORTH AREA

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 27 May 84 p 1

[Text] Drought relief food to Chibi North communal land is not enough and many people in the area are malnourished, Zanu (PF) officials and headmasters in the area have said.

The chairman of a local Zanu (PF) district, Cde Rabson Tamirepi, said since the Department of Social Welfare reduced the drought relief allocation to the area from 580 to 300 bags a month, many people have been unable to get their food allocations.

Cde Tamirepi said the people who were lucky to get drought relief food in the area were receiving less than 10 kg of maize a person each month which was inadequate for people whose staple food is maize.

The headmaster of Jenya Primary School, Cde John Marandure, reported cases of children fainting in class because of hunger.

He said that some parents in the area have had to send their children to relatives working in urban areas.

The Chibi area has been severely ravaged by the drought, Cde Marandure said: "There is nothing to reap from the fields this year."

The peasant farmers in the area have not harvested anything since 1980 when there was a bumper crop.

Grazing for livestock in the area was down to nothing, he said.

The only animals evident in the area are donkeys, which are surviving on tree leaves.

Drinking water is also scarce. Villagers from Madamombe village near Chibi growth point said they have to travel 5 km to get to the nearest source of drinking water.

A local Zanu (PF) official, Cde Simon Madzimure, said some people had tried to help themselves by forming co-operatives making school uniforms but the co-operatives had failed because the money which should have been used to buy children's uniforms was being used to buy food.

CSO: 3400/1071

RENCO GOLD MINE PROSPERS

Harare THE HERALD in English 30 May 84 p 5

[Article by Charles Chikerema]

[Text]

RENCO MINE, situated between the hills by the Mutirikwe River, has given birth to a little boom town in the Nyajena area in Masvingo.

In the midst of speculation as to whether foreign investment has any future in Zimbabwe, the Renco Mine is a success story.

Two small - time mine operators, one called Rennie and the other Coventry, are said to have formed the Renco Syndicate, to "peg and mine" ancient workings in the Nyajena communal area in 1939. Little did they realise they were giving structure to what would become, as Renco Mine, Rio Tinto's major gold mining operation in Zimbabwe.

In its first full year of production last year it became the country's largest single gold producer and earned \$26 million in foreign currency.

At a time when other metals performed poorly as a result of the worldwide recession in industry, the mining company's management considers this to have been a remarkable achievement.

With peace returning to Nyajena at independence in 1980, Rio Tinto started negotiations with the Government and the local inhabitants to acquire 340 ha for the mine expansion project.

This involved the delicate issue of having to remove and resettle 116 families. Naturally there was bound to be resistance to the move by the people whose lives were to be affected.

According to personnel superintendent Cde Josephat Mpofu: "The lives of the inhabitants were centred around Chiwawa Primary School and a Seventh Day Adventist church building."

It would have been difficult to remove them had not the Government, represented by the Ministry of Mines intervened and explained the merits and advantages of the mining project to the people of Nyajena.

By December 1980 the 116 families had moved to the 1 200 ha Tokwe Ranch, 15 km from where Renco Mine has built a modern residential area for the mine employees.

Each of the families who moved to Tokwe Ranch has 12 ha.

The resettlement of the families at Tokwe Ranch, bought by Renco, became the first resettlement exercise in the country, the general manager and consulting engineer of Rio Tinto (Zimbabwe), Mr Dave Ingram, said.

But for the closure of the Empress nickel mine, the operation at Renco would have benefited the people of Nyajena more. Workers left jobless on account of the Empress closure had to be brought to Renco, so only 35 percent of the employees at the mine are from Nyajena and other communal lands in Masvingo province.

But, as Mr Ingram said, Renco was important to the people of Nyajena because it was instrumental in opening up the area, and important to Zimbabwe as a major employer and trainer of manpower as well as an earner of foreign currency.

In 1981 more than 2 000 people were employed at the time of the mine's construction. The mine now provides jobs for 930 Zimbabweans. These

fall under eight departments: mining, milling, engineering, geology, survey, personnel, administration and security.

Mining and milling, which constitute the production unit, employ 62 percent of the total labour force.

To maintain good relationships with the communal farmers in the area, the mine has helped to build a secondary school, and gave over \$70 000 and provided technical advice.

To solve problems that might arise between the communal farmers and mine management, a committee has been set up, made up of local leaders and mine representatives.

When the Prime Minister, Cde Mugabe, officially opened Renco mine on June 25 1982, he said he was impressed by the fact that out of a total construction bill of over \$23 million, \$5,9 million had gone into establishing a new town, providing many amenities.

Cde Mporu said that there had never been industrial problems at the mine leading to work stoppage. With workers coming from different areas there had been some difficulties arising

from the process of integrating them.

According to Mr Ingram, Renco Mine is part of the Nyajena goldfields, and gold mining in the area dates back hundreds of years and could be linked to the commercial activities which were transacted at Great Zimbabwe.

Because of its confidence in the future at Renco, Rio Tinto, which since the closure of Empress nickel mine is now dependent on gold as its main revenue earner, has set aside \$750 000 for further exploration this year.

By Zimbabwean gold mining standards, the Renco ore body was complex and, for this reason, required intensive exploration and careful planning before mining, a mine spokesman said.

He said optimum long-term plans gave Renco a mine life of 10 years based on proven and probable reserves, at present of over 1,2 million tonnes of ore grading 10,6 grammes of gold per tonne.

In 1983, the mine's first full year of production, Renco's gold output totalled 1 843 kg. Zimpapers Feature Service.

MEN HELP WOUNDED BANDIT FLEE

Harare THE HERALD in English 23 May 84 p 17

[Text] Bulawayo--Thirteen men from the curfew areas of Kezi and Gwanda appeared before a Bulawayo regional magistrate yesterday on charges related to dissident activities.

Twelve pleaded guilty and were sentenced to varying jail terms of between one and three years.

Raphael Sibhatha (20) and Gibson Sithole (21), pleaded guilty to being trained by dissidents with the objective of overthrowing the Government.

Magistrate Mr Reay Mackay sentenced them to effective jail terms of one year each.

Stephen Sibanda (21) pleaded guilty to attempting to undergo illegal military training with the intention of becoming a dissident. He was jailed for a year.

Kalathi Ncube (42), Bhathi Sebele (53), Solomon Dube (54), Rabson Moyo (30), Million Moyo (35), Tommy Moyo (48), Simon Dube (33), Herbert Dube (28) and Malobo Ndlovu (59) were jointly charged. They pleaded guilty to assisting a dissident who was injured in a contact with the security forces.

They were sentenced to effective jail terms of three years each.

Samson Dube (44), pleaded guilty to failing to report the presence of dissidents who gave him 3 000 live rounds of ammunition for safekeeping. Sentence on him will be passed today.

The incidents occurred last November.

Gibson Sithole and Raphael Sibhatha were approached by five dissidents who asked them to join in fighting the Government. They agreed, the court found.

Arrangements were made for them to meet the dissidents at Mukebelo Dube's home in the Longline area, Gwanda, three days later.

From Dube's home they were taken to the bush where they underwent weapon training for two weeks.

Life in the bush was hard, however, and they escaped from the dissidents and travelled to Bulawayo where they were arrested in February.

Last November Samson Dube was approached by five dissidents while at his home in the Mlamba-Mpeli area, Kezi. The dissidents gave him 3 000 rounds of ammunition for safe-keeping. They told him they would return for the ammunition later.

Dube did not report he had seen the dissidents until he was arrested in March.

The nine men from Kezi admitted assisting a dissident last November when he was injured during a contact with security forces in the Chehondo area, Kezi.

Mr Godwills Masimirembwa prosecuted.

CSO: 3400/1072

BRIEFS

HEALTH HAZARDS AT CAMPS--The Governor of Mashonaland East, Cde Rwizi Ziyenge, has called for the removal of 600 displaced Mozambicans living at Morris camp in Mudzi district, Mt Darwin, to a place with better health facilities. Cde Ziyenge said this when he handed over 50 bags of mealie-meal, 200 blankets and clothes worth \$1 200 for the displaced to officials of the Department of Social Services at the camp on Wednesday. The camp posed a health hazard to the displaced who were drawing water from a contaminated dam and living amid poor sanitation, he said. The Mozambicans should also be supplied with tents as their make-shift grass huts could easily catch fire. Cde Ziyenge asked all Zimbabweans to give the displaced Mozambicans maximum support to appreciate the assistance they gave Zimbabwe during the armed struggle. Cde Ziyenge warned that if there were displaced people bent on subversion and dissident activities they will be rooted out.--ZIS [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 1 Jun 84 p 11]

IMPORTED MAIZE NEEDED--The Government needs to import about 500 000 tonnes of maize to supplement current stocks, the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Cde Nathan Shamuyarira, said. Addressing a rally at Kariba, he said maize was being imported from Malawi, the United States and Argentina and a contingent of the Zimbabwe National Army was protecting the supply route from Malawi against bandit attacks in Mozambique. [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 1 Jun 84 p 11]

FLOODS HIT TRUCK CONVOYS--Torrential rains over the past few days in the Mwanza and Chileka areas of Malawi have had a "disastrous effect" on truck convoys from Zimbabwe to Malawi through Mozambique. Information which had just reached the Zimbabwe Transport Operators' Association in Harare indicated that floods caused by the rains had extensively damaged the road from the border post of Mwanza to Chileka, rendering the route "nearly impassable," a spokesman said. The problem posed by the floods was "critical" and transporters were deeply concerned over the length of time convoys were taking on the trip, he said. They took seven or eight days for a return journey, while it took four or five days before an army escort was introduced. The convoys have been carrying Zimbabwe's exports to Malawi and bringing back imports, including maize. The slow journey, the spokesman said, increased operating costs because there were fewer trips per month. No attack by MNR bandits on convoys had been reported recently, he said, and praised the Zimbabwean army for its "fine and arduous task" as escort. Talks were continuing between the association and the army to try to improve the travelling time.--Ziana [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 1 Jun 84 p 11]

BULAWAYO PRIEST DETAINED--A detained Bulawayo Anglican priest, the Rev Ozias Nkosana, is being held on allegations of dissident recruitment and "subversive activities," his lawyer said yesterday. Attorney Mr David Coltart said he saw his client on Monday at a police station where he was informed that the 55-year-old priest had been served with detention orders. He "presumed" Mr Nkosana appeared to be under a 30-day detention order. The grounds for his detention are allegations that he has helped with recruiting dissidents and involved in subversive activities of Zapu. Mr Coltart said Mr Nkosana appeared to be in "good health" and had said he had been well treated.--Ziana [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 30 May 84 p 3]

CATTLE INVADE MAIZE PLOTS--Maize plots in Seke are being invaded by cattle from the surrounding communal land. Residents with small plots along the vleis are angry over cattle which mow the ripe maize cobs from the stalks. Mrs Janet Mariranyika of Unit J, who was driving the cattle away with a big stick, said: "I have been toiling on this small plot for almost five months now and then they come to finish off my sweat." Mrs Lainet Chrume of Zengeza 4 said she woke up on Sunday morning to harvest her maize crop. "My eldest son shouted through my bedroom window that our small plot had been invaded by cattle. I hurriedly ran to assist my children who were driving seven head of cattle away. All I have reaped from that plot is 32 cobs of maize which my family is now going to use for maputi." She said she expected to harvest three bags. "Now we are in the red again because of these cattle. Why can't the villagers wait till we finish harvesting before releasing their cattle unattended?" One woman, although angry about the cattle, pointed out that maize fields in Seke are mostly unfenced. About three-quarters of Chitungwiza is surrounded by communal lands. [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 30 May 84 p 5]

BIG RAILWAY EXPORT ORDER--Kampala--The Uganda Railways has ordered 39 railway tank cars from Zimbabwe after receiving a grant of US\$12,5 million from the European Economic Community's fund for the development of African railways. The railways' managing director, Mr James Nduru, said tenders for the tanker wagons had been put out throughout the world and Zimbabwe supplied the best bid. People magazine said US\$2,5 million of the EEC grant was being used to buy the railway cars.--Ziana-AP [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 28 May 84 p 3]

LOAN TO BOOST EXPORTS--London--Confidence in the Zimbabwe economy generally and in the track record of the Agricultural Marketing Authority in particular was reflected in a £20 million credit facility signed in London on Wednesday. The 11 international banks involved, led by the Grindlays Bank group, originally hoped raise £15 million for the AMA, but this was handsomely over-subscribed. A Grindlays official said yesterday that this was "a fair measure of confidence of the banking community in the economic performance of the country at a particularly difficult time, and also in the track record of the AMA." "This is the fourth facility we have arranged for them. We have never had any technical or administrative problem whatsoever." The agreement was signed by AMA administrator, Mr Ronald Samuriwo, and by Mr

R.E. Parke, deputy director of the Reserve Bank. The loan will be used to finance export sales from Zimbabwe of agricultural commodities, including beef, cotton, coffee, groundnuts and soya beans. The Zimbabwe Government has guaranteed the credit, which replaces one for £10 million which expires at the end of this month. The 100 percent increase recognises the higher export targets, particularly for cotton. [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 1 Jun 84 p 3]

INCREASED COTTON PRODUCTION--Cotton growers will harvest 240 000 tonnes in Zimbabwe this season and this is 12 000 tonnes more than the national ginning capacity, the president of the Commercial Cotton Growers' Association, Mr Peter Flanagan, said yesterday. Addressing the 16th annual congress in Harare, Mr Flanagan said costs of moving the cotton from intake depots to gins would have an adverse effect on the trading account and on future producer price negotiations. The association would closely monitor progress by the Cotton Marketing Board in its bid to increase ginning capacity. The Government should treat CMB applications for additional equipment as a priority. Mr Flanagan said there was urgent need for the Agricultural Marketing Authority to take steps to retain experienced staff. "The AMA should be freed of the constraints placed upon it by the Public Service Commission," he said. Mr Flanagan said he was unhappy at the Government's failure to increase the cotton producer price by more than 63,5c a kg this season. The Ministry of Agriculture had failed to appreciate the crisis facing farmers. [Excerpt] [Harare THE HERALD in English 1 Jun 84 p 1]

NRZ TO EXTEND ELECTRIFICATION--Bulawayo--The National Railways of Zimbabwe will introduce electric trains to cover each portion of the main line when funds become available, the acting general manager, Cde Farai Masango, said here yesterday. Welcoming the visiting Netherlands Minister of Transport, Mrs Neelie Smit-Kroes, Cde Masango said that 30 electric locomotives were being manufactured to be used on the Dabuka-Harare line which was opened in October last year. Cde Masango said the present infrastructure of the railways was sound and capable of handling the projected increase in traffic. The visiting transport minister, who is in the country to strengthen and review transport co-operation between Zimbabwe and the Netherlands, has held talks with several Government ministry officials. She is expected to sign a co-operation accord between Air Zimbabwe and KLM, the Dutch airline. Her delegation has been to Victoria Falls.--Ziana [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 23 May 84 p 17]

CSO: 3400/1071

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

29 JUNE 1984